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1. Introduction 
“The greatest change in corporate culture, and the way business is being conducted, 
may be the accelerating growth of relationships based not on ownership, but on 
partnership.”1 
 
In times of rising competition and increasing production costs, companies need to 
rethink their corporate strategies. From market transactions to hierarchical integration, 
companies hold a wide range of possible expansion forms in order to increase the 
company’s profitability and value. In this thesis, hybrid arrangements of market 
transactions and vertical integration2, namely strategic alliances, are analysed. There 
exist many different forms of inter-firm collaborations, such as joint ventures, joint 
development projects or joint production agreements. 
Academics and consultants see in strategic alliances a source of competitive 
advantage and multiple benefits. However, high levels of failure, demonstrated in 
different studies3 have proven that the development and implementation of strategic 
alliances is a challenging task.   
Nevertheless, alliances have become a crucial part of many global companies’ 
expansion strategies. Inter-firm collaborations turned out to be beneficial in many 
ways, for instance by strengthening the competitive position, increasing efficiency 
and accessing needed resources, as well as entering new markets.4 Especially in 
industries with high R&D costs, strategic alliances serve to decrease the development 
and production costs. According to Booz & Co., alone two-thirds of the global R&D 
spending in 2007 was related to computing and electronics, health and the automotive 
industry in 2007.5 
Regarding the automotive industry, car manufacturers tend to rely on inter-firm 
cooperation in order to stay competitive for further reasons, such as rising competition 
and increasing technological requirements and distinctive customer demands.  
                                                
1 Drucker (1996) in Elmuti & Kathawala (2001); p. 205  
2 Cf. Kyle & Teece (2008); p. 1 
3 Cf. Kalmbach & Roussel (1999); pp.1-8; Kale & Singh (2000); p. 45 
4 Cf. Kale & Singh (2000); p. 45 
5 Cf. Booz & Co; 11.05.2012 
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In the nineteen eighties, car companies from Japan, Western Europe and the United 
States dominated the global automotive market. However, after the fall of the Iron 
curtain and due to the advancement of globalization over the past fifteen years, the 
BRIC countries have gained in influence and new competitors mainly from China and 
India entered the existing markets. In addition, the newly developed markets offered 
great opportunities for the leading car manufacturers. Furthermore the car 
manufacturing companies had to bear great challenges such as the shift of growth 
markets, changing mobility requirements and the recent financial crisis.  
In future, the car industry has to face increasing production costs due to wider product 
ranges, higher fuel prices, as well as the development of electric and hybrid vehicles. 
However, many companies lack in financial resources and technological capacities to 
bear all these challenges by themselves. 
In this context, this present thesis serves as an analysis of the development of strategic 
alliances between original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) over the past thirty years 
from a practical and theoretical point of view. It is questioned whether the rate of 
alliance formations increased in comparison to mergers and acquisitions, with the 
advancement of globalization and structural changes or not. Furthermore, theoretical 
approaches such as the Resource Based View, the Transaction Costs Theory, the 
Strategic Choice Perspective, as well as the Diversification Theory are elucidated and 
it is analysed if the theoretical perspectives serve as explanatory approaches for the 
conclusion of strategic alliances.  
Ensuing the theoretical perspectives, the different motives for the formation of 
alliances are derived and it is examined, whether the major motivation for alliance 
formations remained the same over the past three decades or not. In addition, the 
empirical data, which contains a listing of all the concluded alliances from 1980 to 
2011, is analysed to find further indicators for the rate of alliance conclusions such as 
the number of competitors and the economic situation.  
The analysis is divided into four chapters. The focus lies on the theoretical 
explanations, a description of the cyclical evolution of the automotive industry, an 
explicit illustration of the connections between the car manufacturers, the bonding 
between theory and practice, as well as on the elaboration of the different hypotheses. 
Chapter 2 presents the basic considerations of strategic alliances and describes the 
different types, the motives and the risks of strategic alliances. Furthermore, the 
different theoretical approaches are described. 
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The first part of chapter 3 offers an overview of the cyclical evolution of the 
automotive industry. Mainly based on reports from different automobile associations, 
this chapter serves to comprehend the development of alliances in the automotive 
industry from a more general point of view. The second part of the chapter illustrates, 
in chronological order, the formation of strategic alliances in comparison to mergers 
and acquisitions within the industry. Furthermore, the evolution of the motives is 
presented. For instance, badge engineering was very common in the nineteen eighties, 
whereas the agreements between the companies became much more complex in the 
twenty-first century. 
In chapter 4, an analysis of whether the Transaction Costs Theory, the Resource 
Based View, the Strategic Choice Perspective or the Modern Portfolio Theory serve 
as sensible explanatory approaches will be demonstrated. Four different hypotheses 
are elaborated and tested in order to illustrate the conclusion of strategic alliances 
from a theoretical point of view. Furthermore, the results are presented and additional 
reflections are laid out. 
Finally, a conclusion is drawn and the main findings of the thesis are summarised. 
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2. Strategic alliances 
2.1 Definition 
The concept of strategic alliances refers to different types of partnership agreements 
between two or more companies that pursue clear strategic collaboration objectives, 
with different levels of possible integration among the members. According to Elmuti 
and Kathawala, “strategic alliances are partnerships of two or more corporations or 
business units that work together to achieve strategically significant objectives that 
are mutually beneficial.”6 
Furthermore strategic alliance can be seen as a “voluntary, formal arrangement 
between two or more parties to pool resources to achieve a common set of objectives 
that meet critical needs while remaining independent entities.”7  
The companies invest in an activity or number of years, they share the risks and the 
potential returns, but they remain independent economic agents. Only if, the partner 
companies found one form of an alliance, a joint venture, then the companies form a 
new legal entity. 
These inter-firm collaborations8 involve exchange, sharing, or co-development of 
products, services, procedures, and processes. The main goal is to sustain long-term 
competitive advantages in a fast-changing world. This can be achieved by reducing 
costs through economies of scale, boosting research and development efforts, 
increasing access to new technology, entering new markets, breathing life into 
slowing or stagnant markets, reducing cycle times, improving quality, or inhibiting 
competitors.9 
According to Hyder and Abraha strategic alliances occur by necessity and are 
engineered to create and exploit new opportunities. The key parameters are 
opportunism, necessity and speed. On one hand, the companies try to maintain 
knowledge and leadership. On the other hand they try to minimize time to market in 
order to exploit the briefest of business opportunities.10 
                                                
6 Elmuti & Kathawala (2001); p. 206 
7 Serrat (20009); p. 2 
8 Cf. Cools & Roos (2005); p. 8 
9 Cf. Serrat (2009); p. 2 
10 Cf. Hyder & Abraha (2007); p. 17 
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The topic is widely discussed in literature and there is no general definition of a 
strategic alliance. For instance, Wheelen and Hungar say that “a strategic alliance is 
an agreement between firms to do business together in ways that go beyond normal 
company-to-company dealings, but fall short of a merger or a full partnership”11. 
Ernst and Bamford define an alliance as “an agreement between two or more separate 
companies in which there is shared risk, returns, and control, as well as some 
operational integration and mutual dependence.”12 
Alliances are defined as “strategic”, if there is a sharing of capabilities, such as R&D 
or manufacturing, that affects long-term competitiveness of the organisations 
involved. This implies a relatively long-term commitment of resources by partners.13 
Although the main focus of this thesis lies on strategic alliances, companies also 
apply other methods of development. In addition to strategic alliances, Johnson and 
Scholes list two further methods - internal development and acquisition (or 
disposal).14 
Internal development means that a company’s strategy consists in building up own 
resources and knowledge. Some companies want to grow organically and do not want 
to rely on external partners. 
There are two basic types of mergers and acquisitions. First, one company buys the 
equity shares of another company, which then loses its decision-making power. 
After the acquisition, both the companies will become a single legal entity. Second, a 
new legal entity is created to combine the assets and operations of two companies and 
shareholders of both companies will be offered shares of the new entity.15 In other 
words, one organisation develops its resources and knowledge by taking over another 
company or by merging with another company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 Wheelen & Hungar (2009); pp.125-134. 
12 Ernst & Bamford (2005); pp. 133 – 141. 
13 Cf. Lasserre (2007); p.99 
14 Cf. Johnson & Scholes (2002); p. 374 
15 Cf. Financial Times; 11.05.2012 
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2.2 Types of alliances 
There are different perceptions of how to classify the different types of alliances. 
Barney for instance names three categories – non-equity alliances, equity alliances 
and joint ventures.16 Concerning the legal form, there are three different types of 
alliances – equity joint ventures, minority equity investments and contractual 
arrangement, also known as non-equity alliances.   
Contractual arrangements do not involve sharing or exchanging equity. Furthermore 
the partner companies do not create a new organizational entity. The alliance 
members use their own organizational structure and platform.17 The concluded 
contract sets the mutual rights and obligations and specifies each firm’s inputs to the 
alliance and specifies the termination of the cooperation.18 
Non-equity arrangements include unidirectional agreements, such as licensing and 
distribution agreements, and bidirectional agreements such as joint R&D or 
manufacturing partnerships.19 For instance, most car manufacturers are part of an 
alliance to produce certain car parts more efficiently.  
Equity arrangements include joint ventures and minority equity investments. In a joint 
venture, two or more partners create a new and independent jointly owned entity. The 
respective equity participations are clearly defined and valuations of contributions are 
isolated from the parent companies’ own accounts.20 The Board of Directors consists 
of executives from the partner companies. The employees are directly recruited by the 
Board or transferred by the parent companies.  Each partner company possesses 
controlling and voting rights corresponding to the equity participations and receives a 
share of the returns in proportion to its level of ownership. 
In a minority equity investment, one firm buys an equity participation in the capital of 
the other. This type of alliance may be close to an acquisition, but as long as the 
equity partner does not get full control of the operation, it is still considered as 
strategic alliance.21 Further, many companies include cross-equity holdings in order to 
strengthen the bonding between the respective partners. 
                                                
16 Cf. Barney (1996); p. 370 
17 Cf. Gulati (1995), p.88 
18 Cf. Kale & Singh (2009), p. 49 
19 Cf. Gulati (1995), p. 89 
20 Cf. Lasserre (2007), p. 116 
21 Cf. Lasserre (2007), p. 117 
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However, transaction cost economists consider joint ventures and minority equity 
investments as being one category, because “a direct equity investment by one firm 
into another essentially creates an equity joint venture between one firm’s existing 
shareholders and the corporate investor.”22  
Johnson and Scholes differentiate between organisations, with no shareholding or 
ownership involved, loose arrangements of cooperation and informal networking. 
They name joint ventures, consortia, networks, opportunistic alliances, franchising 
and licensing as different types of strategic alliances.23 There are many examples of 
such alliances in the automotive industry. For instance car manufacturers and car 
dealerships sustain franchising agreements, the car dealers belong to different 
networks and car manufacturers and suppliers maintain opportunistic alliances. 
Nevertheless a more specific classification for alliances between car manufacturers is 
required. 
In this sense, Lasserre differentiates between global and local alliances. Local 
alliances under the form of joint ventures are traditional vehicles for market entry in 
countries that aimed at bringing value adding productive activities to their economy, 
protecting their natural resources and also promoting the strategic development of 
national firms.24 For instance, the current Chinese automotive policy states that a 
foreign carmaker must form a joint venture with a Chinese carmaker if the foreign 
companies intend to produce its vehicles in China. The logic of these joint ventures is 
simple, the foreign companies get access to the growing Chinese market and in 
exchange, Chinese companies get access to foreign technologies. 
Global alliances, for instance, are much more complex and elaborated in their 
strategic and economic scope. Doz and Hamel differentiate between three broad types 
of strategic alliances – coalitions, co-specializations and learning alliances.25 
Coalitions turn potential rivals into allies and providers of the complementary goods 
and services that allow new businesses to develop. In 1999, the leading car 
manufacturers, such as Ford, BMW, Toyota and PSA, formed the Alliance of 
Automobile Manufacturers in the United States. The main goal of the coalition is to 
                                                
22 Gulati (1995), pp. 88; Pisano, (1989), p. 111 
23 Cf. Johnson & Scholes (2002); p. 380 
24 Cf. Lasserre (2007); pp. 100-101 
25 Cf. Doz & Hamel (1998); p. 4 
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represent the common interest of its members.26 Furthermore, the alliance is active in 
political lobbying on behalf of the industry. 
“Cospecialization is the synergic value creation that results from combining 
previously separate resources, positions, skills, and knowledge sources.”27 Partners 
combine their unique and different resources, such as skills, know-how and tangible 
assets, to develop and build new technologies or products, in a joint effort. For 
example, BMW and PSA concluded an alliance in 2010, in order to bundle their 
efforts in producing electric and hybrid cars.  
Many alliances are also formed for learning and internalization reasons. The 
companies want to obtain new skills and technologies. The so-called learning 
alliances28 enable the transfer of know-how between the partners. The alliance of 
Nissan and Renault is a great example of a well functioning knowledge transfer in 
strategic alliances. 
2.3 Why strategic alliances?  
In today’s globalised world, strategic alliances seem unavoidable. Authors and 
business experts agree on this point, but there are many different explanations for this 
phenomenon. Some argue, that strategic alliances are essential in today’s business 
strategy and a matter of survival. According to Kanter „alliances between companies, 
whether they are from different parts of the world or different ends of the supply 
chain, are a fact of life in business today”.29 
Furthermore, there exist many external driving forces pushing companies to form 
alliances, such as turbulences in the world markets, high economic uncertainty, 
globalization of technology or shortening product life cycles. Especially in the 
automotive industry the fast technological change, e.g. hybrid and electric 
technologies, leads to increasing investment requirements.30 
However, the failure rate of strategic alliances varies between thirty and seventy per 
cent.31 Furthermore, failures can be very expensive. A study by Gonzales has shown, 
                                                
26 Cf. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers; 11.05.2012 
27 Cf. Doz & Hamel (1998); p. 5 
28 Cf. Lasserre (2007); p. 101 
29 Kanter (1994); pp. 96 – 108. 
30 Cf. Child et al. (2005); p. 80 
31 Cf. Kale and Singh (2009); p. 45 
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that the 15 least successful alliances in 2001 decreased market capitalization by $43 
billion.32 
This shows, that strategic alliances do not guarantee higher profit. In the following 
paragraphs, the reasons why companies enter strategic alliances, even if the risk of 
failure is omnipresent, are illustrated. 
 
Growth strategies and entering new markets 
 
The expansion in new markets is very time-consuming and expensive. Especially in 
today’s fast changing markets and highly competitive environments, first mover 
advantages are becoming indispensable. At the same time, companies simply do not 
have the resources to establish new markets one-by-one. Therefore an alliance 
between a technological strong company with new products and a company with 
strong market access is the only way to take advantage of an opportunity in time.  
Internal development would take much longer and acquisitions are more expensive 
and implicate higher risks.33 Furthermore local companies mostly sustain closer 
relationships with local suppliers and other stakeholders. 
In this sense, Fiat and Tata Motors concluded a joint venture in 2006. Both companies 
operate production facilities together in India. This allows Fiat to enter the Indian 
market, whereas Tata Motors increases its technological know-how. 
 
Learning / Obtaining new technology  
 
According to Kogut34, learning is one of the three major motivations for alliance 
formation. If a company cannot develop the required technologies, there are two 
possibilities. Either the company acquires another company with the specific 
knowledge, or it concludes an alliance with such a firm. However acquisitions have 
many disadvantages such as the internalization of unwanted assets or moral hazard. 
Alliances involve fewer commitments, costs and smaller investments.35 
For instance Nissan was nearly insolvent before its partnership with Renault, but 
                                                
32 Cf. Gonzales (2001); p. 2 
33 Cf. Child et al. (2005); p. 89 
34 Cf. Kogut (1988) pp. 319-332 
35 Cf. Child et al. (2005); p. 88 
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possessed a great technological know-how. Consequently, the partnership was a win-
win situation for both companies. Nissan received financial aid and Renault could 
improve its technology. 
 
Cost minimization / Sharing costs of research and development 
 
One main reason for concluding alliances is cost minimization. This may occur in two 
different ways. First the companies can reduce their expenses through economies of 
scale and rationalization. When Fiat and Tata Motors opened a production facility 
together in India, they reduced the production costs for both companies. Due to the 
increasing number of produced units, the production costs per car decreased. 
Furthermore the production is rationalized by using the same platforms and the same 
parts.  
Especially in the automotive industry cost minimization is a crucial competitive 
advantage. Car manufacturers have to bear exceedingly high R&D expenses. Capacity 
utilization and synergy effects are becoming increasingly important. 
In this sense, many car manufacturers sustain platform-sharing agreements with other 
manufacturers36. Honda, Nissan and Lexus; Ford, Mazda and Volvo or Fiat, Opel and 
Cadillac are only a few examples of car alliances, in which the companies shared the 
same platform for some of their cars. 
Second, some companies may have the know-how and the financial capabilities, but 
seek for lower production costs. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Eastern European 
countries such as Romania or Slovakia became very attractive for the global car 
companies, due to the proximity to Western Europe and lower labour costs. 
 
Reduce financial risk  
 
For many companies the financial risk which is involved in pursuing a new product or 
production method is too big to bear it alone. In such cases, two or more companies 
come together and agree on spreading the risk among all of them. 
                                                
36 “An automobile platform is a shared set of common design, engineering and 
production efforts, as well as major components over a number of outwardly distinct 
models and even types of automobiles, often from different, but related marques.” 
Brylawski (1999); pp. 1  
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Currently there is a growing push in the automotive industry for cleantech technology 
and the run after new technologies for hybrid or electric cars is very expensive. The 
processing is still in its infancy and many companies do not want to bear the R&D 
costs on their own. For this reason many companies form partnerships to unify the 
financial and the research efforts. A good example would be BMW and Toyota, 
which recently agreed to collaborate on research for cleaner, next-generation car 
batteries.37 
  
Achieve or ensure competitive advantage 
 
Many small companies do not have the resources to compete with larger competitors. 
They simply do not have the financial background and the capacities even if they 
have the best technology. These companies rely on partnerships or alliances to 
compete against larger rivals. By forming alliances with other companies, smaller 
businesses can accomplish bigger projects more efficient resulting in better margins, 
than if they tried to do it on their own.For instance, Tesla, the leading producer of 
electronic vehicles in the world, has recently concluded an alliance with Toyota. This 
enables Tesla to increase the number of cars produced per year and ameliorate its 
position in the automotive industry, whereas Toyota gets access to Tesla’s know-how. 
2.4 Risks and problems in strategic alliances 
Contracts in alliances are difficult to set up. Full control is not feasible, for legal and 
practical reasons, and many uncertainties are involved, mainly because none of the 
parties involved has the ability to develop the needed capability internally. 
In this sense, an alliance is an incomplete contract that cannot fully specify what each 
party should do under every conceivable condition. Furthermore, it requires “that both 
parties engage in some form of trusting open-ended relationship in which decision-
making is shared in order to allocate resources and distribute the outcome of the joint 
activity according to the prevailing business conditions.”38 
Das and Teng differentiate between relational risk and performance risk. Relational 
risk is the risk of unsatisfactory inter-firm cooperation. There is always a risk of the 
                                                
37 Cf. NDTV; 11.05.2012 
38 Lasserre (2007); p. 99 
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alliance partner lacks commitment and is driven by opportunistic means. 
Companies are interested in accomplishing their self-interests first. Opportunistic 
behaviour can occur in different forms, such as shirking, appropriating the partner’s 
resources, distorting information and delivering unsatisfactory products and 
services.39 
Nevertheless it may occur that even if the alliance worked well for a few years, 
partners may become incompatible over time. For instance, firms that once needed 
each other to enter a market and/or improve a technology may have no longer 
interests in sustaining the alliance. Thus, opportunistic behaviour can arise at the 
beginning of an alliance, but also after the accomplishment of the goals, set up by the 
alliance partners. Therefore the companies must define clear goals and determining an 
endpoint could make sense too. 
Performance risk is the probability that an alliance may fail, even if both parties are 
fully committed to the alliance. There are many possible internal and external threats 
such as “environmental factors, e.g. government policy changes, war, and economic 
recession; market factors, such as fierce competition and demand fluctuations; and 
internal factors, such as a lack of competence in critical areas, or sheer bad luck.”40 
Toyota and General Motors concluded a joint venture in the early 1980s. GM needed 
Toyota’s help to build small cars and Toyota needed to produce cars in the United 
States in order to get access to the U.S. market, due to import restrictions set up by the 
U.S. Congress. So Toyota took over a former General Motors plant, situated in 
Fremont. The Japanese carmaker even realized to turn one of GM’s worst factories in 
one of GM’s best. With the same workforce, Toyota managed to improve the quality 
of the cars and increase the production capacities considerably. Nevertheless GM did 
not realize to adapt the production system introduced by Toyota to other plants. 
Finally GM went bankrupt due to internal reasons and an increasing loss in market 
share. 
Many alliances are concluded, because one partner needs the technological know-how 
of the other company. This can create an awkward situation for both partners. One 
company is always confronted with identifying and isolating what types of knowledge 
it can safely share with the partner. The company cannot control how its knowledge is 
used, once given away. In this sense firms always run the risk of giving their partner 
                                                
39 Cf. Das & Teng (1999) p. 51 
40 Das & Teng (1999); pp. 50-62 
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more insights into their production skills than intended.41 
On the other hand, the partner company may fear that it is not receiving all the needed 
information. In other words, one company may presume that the other partner keeps 
required knowledge in secret and perceived inequity arises. This may result in a loss 
of trust in the alliance, especially when one firm is more successful than the other. It 
is easier to make the partnering company responsible for the negative outcome, what 
only creates further tensions.42 
Pitts and Lei, state that the risk of dependence is yet another risk in alliances. Firms 
that rely on the technological know-how of the partner company can become 
dependent on its partner without even noticing it. The U.S. car manufacturer Chrysler, 
for example, concluded a joint venture with Mitsubishi Motors in the 1970s. Chrysler 
had difficulties with producing small cars with low mileage, so they thought that this 
alliance would save them time and money. However, over time Chrysler became over 
reliant on Mitsubishi to build new lines of cars for them. As a result, Chrysler’s 
production skills deteriorated. At this stage, an alliance can become menacing for the 
weaker partner, because the other company can exercise a high level of control and a 
hold-up problem can occur.43 
A further crucial problem that can appear during a partnership is the cultural clash. 
Companies from different countries, work in different ways and the problems might 
consist of language, egos, chauvinism, and different attitudes to business.44 American 
companies for instance evaluate the company’s performance on profit and financial 
benefits, whereas Japanese companies evaluate the performance on how an operation 
helps to build its strategic position, particularly by improving its skills45. 
The lack of clear goals and objectives are further reasons of failure according to 
Elmuti and Kathawala. Furthermore they state that the coordination between the 
management team can cause problems. Especially, when the companies remain 
competitors in spite of their strategic alliance.46 
 
                                                
41 Cf. Pitts & Lei (2005) p. 228 
42 Cf. Jiang et al. (2008); p. 185 
43 Cf. Pitts & Lei (2005); p. 228 
44 Cf. Kilburn (1999) p. 20 
45 Cf. Daniels & Radebaugh (2001); p. 479-511. 
46 Cf. Elmuti & Kathawala (2001); p. 209 
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2.5 Theoretical perspectives of strategic alliances 
With the increasing importance of strategic alliances, academic researchers have also 
started paying substantive attention to alliances. Different theoretical perspectives of 
strategic alliances have already been explored, such as the Transaction Costs Theory 
or the Resource Based Theory. In the following part the implications of different 
theories on strategic alliances are elucidated. 
2.5.1 Transaction Costs Theory 
The Transaction Costs Theory belongs to the “new institutional economics” paradigm 
and is deals with the minimization of the companies production and transaction costs. 
The production costs vary depending on learning and experience effects, location 
advantages, and proprietary influences. The transaction costs are associated with 
arranging, managing and monitoring transactions across markets.47 The theory 
became widely known via Oliver Williamson’s Transaction Costs Economics, 
published in 1975.48  
According to Williamson, all economic activity revolves around a transaction, which 
is one form of exchange of a good or service between two or more economic actors. 
Furthermore he questions, when and why a company should acquire a good or service 
by outsourcing rather than producing it on its own.49  
The simplest application of the Transaction Costs Theory, also known as transaction 
costs economics, is the make-or-buy decision. It is cheaper to buy a specific product 
from a specialized company than producing it itself. However, the market fails, when 
transaction costs are prohibitive in the judgement of the key decision makers in the 
company. As a consequence the company is forced to internalize the production 
instead of acquiring it on the market. The Transaction Cost Economics explain why a 
company might choose to internalize the production of a good or component instead 
of buying it even if the production costs are higher than those offered by the 
specialized company.50  
However, Williamson assumes two economic hazards in the different governance 
structures – bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality refers to the 
                                                
47 Cf. Barringer & Harrison (2000); p. 369 
48 Cf. Lowensberg (2010) p. 1093 
49 Cf. Williamson (2010); p. 686 
50 Cf. Barringer & Harrison (2000); p. 371 
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fact, that “economic actors have limited data and constrained information-processing 
abilities and that future is often unknowable.”51 If bounded rationality did not exist, 
complete contracts could organize all economic activity efficiently. Opportunism 
refers to the assumption that economic actors are primarily interested in their own 
personal success or well-being and will disregard the interests of their partners if they 
can get away with it.52  
Moreover companies seek to optimize the flow of goods and services and minimize 
the corresponding transaction costs. Naturally, the higher the costs due to incomplete 
contracts and potential damage from opportunism, the more appropriate governance 
mechanisms are needed to protect the alliance from these potential hazards. This leads 
again to higher transaction costs.53 
Heide and John argue, that opportunistic behaviour can be lowered by relational 
norms, such as trust. They affirm, that trust can enhance control mechanisms to boost 
mutual beneficial exchanges.54 Logically a partnership can better withstand 
uncertainties of environmental and organizational changes, when partners trust each 
other. Furthermore companies are rather willing to invest in the relationship, when 
they are convinced of the partner’s competence and trustworthiness. 
Further governance mechanisms are equity control and contractual safeguards. Gulati 
and Singh stated, that mutual equity investments reduce the risks of opportunistic 
behaviour. According to the authors, the absence of cross shareholdings can lead to a 
moral hazard problem. If one partner does not hold equity interests in the partner 
company, the risk of opportunistic behaviour rises again.55 
Contractual safeguards stand for the efforts during the negotiation of the alliance to 
avoid self-interested behaviour during the alliance. The contracts need to clearly 
implicate the goals and expectations of each partner.56 
Barringer and Harrisson expanded the application of the common make-or-buy 
decision to make, buy or partner. According to the authors, an inter-firm cooperation, 
such as a joint venture or a network structure, is an adequate alternative to a market or 
                                                
51 Judge & Dooley (2006); p. 26 
52 Cf. Judge & Dooley (2006); p. 26 
53 Cf. Judge & Dooley (2006); p. 26 
54 Cf. Heide & John (1990); p. 32 
55 Cf. Gulati & Singh (1998); p.807 
56 Cf. Judge & Dooley (2006); p. 27 
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organisational hierarchy.57 In this context, strategic alliances can be seen as hybrid 
arrangements of market transactions and hierarchy or full internalization.58 
2.5.2 Resource Based View 
According to the Resource Based View, a company consists of a collection of 
resources. Tsang differentiates between physical resources, human resources and 
organizational resources. Physical resources include tangible assets, such as plants, 
equipment, finished and semi-finished goods, as well as intangible assets like the 
brand name or patents. The organizational resources include corporate culture, 
organizational structure, procedures and management systems.59 
According to Das and Teng, many resources are firm-specific and perfectly imitable, 
therefore firms remain heterogeneous in terms of their resource base. As a 
consequence, “sustained firm resource heterogeneity becomes a possible source of 
competitive advantage, which then leads to economic rents, or above normal 
returns”.60  
In contrast to different strategy models defining a company’s strategy through its 
competitive environment, the RBV states that a company’s strategy is critically 
influenced by accumulated resources. In other words, a company should pay more 
attention to its own resources than to its competitive environment. 
Birner Wernerfelt, being the first author to apply the Resource Based View in the 
field of strategic management, stated “a firm wants to create a situation where its own 
resource position directly or indirectly makes it more difficult for others to catch 
up”.61  
In the context of the automotive industry, this would be a new technology like a 
specific fuel-efficient propulsion system or innovative designs of a car manufacturer. 
Wernerfeld also created the concept of acquiring or merging with other companies to 
buy or sell resources. Through the acquisition of a company one could also gain its 
technological capabilities for instance. 
The Resource Based View seems particularly appropriate for examining strategic 
alliances, because firms often use strategic alliances to gain access to another 
                                                
57 Cf. Judge & Dooley (2006); p. 28 
58 Cf. Kyle & Teece (2008); p. 1 
59 Cf. Tsang (1997); p. 208 
60 Das & Teng (2000); p. 32 
61 Wernerfeld (1984); p. 173 
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companies’ valuable resources.62 In this context, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven found 
out, that companies tend to conclude alliances especially when they are in need of 
resources or when they are in a strong social position. Furthermore, their empirical 
results indicated, that with an increase in competitors, the rate of alliance formations 
increases too.63 
According to the Resource Based View, companies enter strategic alliances to share, 
aggregate, combine or exchange resources with other companies, when these 
resources cannot be efficiently obtained through market transactions or merger and 
acquisitions. Furthermore, strategic alliances should be favoured over mergers and 
acquisitions for two reasons. First, a company mostly does not want to acquire all the 
resources of another company. Through an alliance, the company only gets access to 
the desired resources. Second, some of the less valuable resources in an acquisition 
cannot be easily dropped without taking a loss.64 For instance, BMW was mainly 
interested in the Mini and Land Rover brands when acquiring the Rover Group. 
Nevertheless, BMW had to buy the whole group.  
2.5.3 The Strategic Choice Perspective 
The Strategic Choice Perspective, established by John Child in 197265, is based on the 
assumption that companies conclude inter-organizational alliances to increase 
competitiveness or market power.  
Thereby this management theory focuses on the role played by managers in shaping 
conditions and processes outside and within the company in order to reach certain 
objectives, such as increased market power or increasing sales volumes.66 According 
to Judge and Zeithaml, organizational members are free to shape their own fates. 
Hence the perspective focuses on the executives and managers within organizations to 
explain organizational processes.67 
Firms use different reasons to justify the conclusion of alliances, such as increasing 
market power, increasing speed to market or blocking the moves of competitors.68  
                                                
62 Das & Teng (2000); p. 33 
63 Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1996); p.147 
64 Das & Teng (2000); p. 37 
65 Child (1972); p. 4 
66 Child et al. (2005); p.88 
67 Judge & Zeithaml (1992); p. 770 
68 Barringer & Harrison (2000); p. 374 
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Shan and Hamilton highlight, that in alliances with local companies, the selection of a 
local partner may be a strictly strategic decision. The choice of the local partner is 
sometimes crucial for the long-term competitiveness in a foreign market and rather 
strategically motivated than based on specific resource dependency needs or 
transaction costs considerations.69 This seems to be particularly applicable in China. 
The Chinese automotive industry increased considerably in size and importance in the 
last twenty years. At the moment more than eighty Chinese car-manufacturing 
companies exist.70 The company constructions differ from fully state-owned to private 
companies and there are great differences in terms of government support, licenses, 
distribution and access to suppliers. In this sense, it is important to find a local 
partner, where an equal distribution of controlling and voting rights as well as the 
protection of intellectual property is guaranteed. These are crucial factors for a long 
and successful partnership. 
Barringer and Harrison state that the Strategic Choice Perspective is still very broad 
and motivations from many different perspectives can be incorporated into the 
strategic choice theory. Therefore there is no consensus on how the “inter-
organizational relationship strategies” should be sorted into meaningful groups for 
studies.71 Furthermore, joint ventures are often concluded due to market entry 
barriers. In order to protect domestic industry or to ensure, that foreign companies to 
cooperate with local partners, many governments set up market entry barriers. This 
means that, although different theoretical perspectives, such as the Transaction Costs 
View deliver good explanations for the conclusion of inter-firm collaborations, the 
reason is sometimes more pragmatic. Namely, the companies are forced to choose a 
joint venture as market entry form. According to Miles and Snow, the Strategic 
Choice Perspective is defined by three major characteristics. They state, “that the 
perspective views managerial or strategic choice as the primary link between 
organization and environment, focuses on management’s ability to create, learn about, 
and manage the organization’s environment and encompasses the multiple ways that 
organizations respond to environmental conditions.”72 In this sense, car-
manufacturing companies seeking to enter an emerging market need to scan, identify 
                                                
69 Cf. Barringer & Harrison (2000); p. 375 
70 Cf. Zhao (2009); p. 2 
71 Barringer & Harrison (2000); p. 375 
72 Judge and Zeithaml (1992); p. 770 citing Miles & Snow (1978) 
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and capitalize on opportunities on the market and bear the costs and risks of possible 
market and contextual changes.73  
In the 1980s, for instance the U.S. government constricted the import rate of Japanese 
vehicles. As a consequence, Japanese car manufacturers opened production facilities 
in the U.S. in collaboration with local companies such as GM or Chrysler. 
The BRIC countries China and Russia also restricted the establishment of wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises in order to promote the local economy. In China, foreign 
car manufacturers must conclude a 50:50 joint venture with a local manufacturer, if 
they want to operate in China.74 In 2010, the Chinese government even considered to 
force foreign OEMs to reveal their electric-vehicle technology to Chinese companies 
in exchange for access to the nation’s huge market.75  
To sum up, the Strategic Choice Perspective explains how organizations adapt to 
environmental forces in order to increase competitiveness or enter new markets. 
2.5.4 The Modern Portfolio Theory 
The modern portfolio theory indicates that through greater diversification in an 
investment portfolio, the financial risk of unexpected losses is lowered.  
Introduced in 1952 by Harry Markovitz, the theory attempts to maximize the expected 
return of a portfolio or equivalently minimize the risk for a given level of expected 
return by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets with different levels of 
risk. The theory is widely used in the financial industry.76 
However, diversification can also be beneficial on the corporate level. For instance 
the use of economies of scale, market power and economies of scope can be 
implemented at the enterprise level through diversification strategies. This means that 
companies can lower the risk of failure by offering different products, by entering 
new segments or by opening a new market. Moreover, the companies can pursue a 
diversification strategy through mergers, acquisitions and the conclusion of strategic 
alliances. On the financial market, diversification leads to a relative increase in yield, 
whereas on the corporate level, diversification may lead to an increase of the market 
value of the respective companies.77 However, the financial risk of a merger or 
                                                
73 Cf. Luo and Tan (1998); p. 24 
74 Cf. Auto Focus Asia; 11.05.2012 
75 Cf. The Wall Street Journal; 11.05.2012  
76 Cf. Financial Times; 14.06.2012 
77 Cf. Fichtner (2007); pp. 24, 25 
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acquisition is high. In case of financial troubles of the newly acquired company, the 
market value of both companies may decrease. For instance, after the fusion of 
Daimler and Chrysler, both companies had to face significant declines in the market 
value due to a breakdown of the sales volumes and subsequent financial losses of 
Chrysler. 
From the point of view of the automotive industry, diversification leads to a reduction 
of the financial risk on two different levels. First, OEMs can reduce the risk of failure 
by diversifying their product range and entering different segments. In this context, 
companies form alliances in order to reduce the financial risk of the required 
investments. Second, the companies should conclude partnerships, other than mergers 
or acquisitions, in order to reduce the financial risk of an inter-firm collaboration. 
Thus, the conclusion of different strategic alliances generally requires minor 
investments than the acquisition of a competitor.  
In this sense, the concept of a diversified portfolio, which leads to more consistent 
returns, can be applied for companies maintaining different partnerships.  The 
conclusion of different alliances leads to a diversification of risk, as well as more 
secure and consistent cash flows. 
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3. The Automotive Industry 
3.1 The economic development of the automotive industry 
This chapter offers an overview of the evolution of the automotive industry from 1980 
on. The products and the companies have evolved a lot since that time and many 
carmakers disappeared or merged with other companies. The product range prospered 
considerably and the costs for new innovations increased. Furthermore the markets in 
Europe, the United States and Japan have become more and more saturated and new 
markets such as India, Brazil or China have emerged.  
Indeed the automotive industry includes industries associated with the production, 
wholesaling, retailing, and maintenance of motor vehicles78, but however, in this 
dissertation, the focus lies on car manufactures, also known as original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM). OEMs are companies that combine self-made or bought-in 
components to complete vehicles and offer them to consumers on the market. 
Suppliers are companies in the supply chain that provide the OEMs with industrial 
intermediate products and bring appropriate services.79 
After the oil crisis in the 1970s, the automotive companies started developing more 
fuel-efficient cars and put greater emphasis on safety. Furthermore the electric 
components became more important. In 1980, 88,9 % of the cars were produced in 
Europe, Japan and the U.S., whereas, Japan outran the U.S. as biggest car 
manufacturer and became a big threat for the American and European car 
manufacturers, even on their home markets.80 However, the Japanese government 
concluded a voluntary restraint agreement with the U.S. and several European 
countries to limit Japanese exports.81  
In 1980, the companies started to improve the efficiency and quality of their cars. 
Japanese and European car manufacturers started establishing plants in the U.S. and 
global competition rose. Especially the U.S. companies had to face severe problems. 
The production costs were too high and the quality of the cars was poor. The sales 
                                                
78 Cf. The Bureau of Labour Statistics; 11.05.2012 
79 Cf. Wallentowitz et al. (2009), p.1 
80 Cf. VDA Report 1980; pp. 22-24 
81 Cf. Singleton (1992); p. 3 
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volumes decreased and several plants had to be closed. As a consequence, several 
U.S. carmakers concluded collaborations with Japanese companies.82 
The companies had to face several challenges, such as the internationalization of 
production and sales, higher production costs and increased competition. As a 
consequence some companies were taken over or disappeared.  
However, the industry expanded in the eighties and the production volume increased 
from 38,56 million cars in 1980 up to 48,7 million cars in 1990.83 The companies 
from Japan, the U.S. and Western Europe even realized to increase their combined 
market share from 88,9 % up to 90,9 % in the same period.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union had extensive consequences for the Western 
economies and consequently for the automotive industry. Countries with huge raw 
material resources and unsaturated high sales potential now took part in the global 
competition for wealth and growth. Hence globalisation began. The changes of the 
global economic environment hit the automotive industry particularly hard. On the 
one hand, the companies had to reconsider its production locations due to high-level 
differences in factor costs. On the other hand, the opening of the Iron Curtain allowed 
the attainment of millions of new potential clients. Henceforth the automotive 
industry had to cope with locational competition and cut-throat competition.84 
In addition to this, the automotive industry suffered under a recession in the early 
nineties and the global sales volumes decreased from 48,7 million cars in 1990 to 47,2 
million in 1992. Only the U.S. companies realized to overcome their structural 
problems and the sales volumes increased compared to the late 1980s. Furthermore, 
the impact of emerging countries like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina or South Korea, on 
the market rose. In 1992, already 16,2 % of the cars produced worldwide, were 
produced outside of the triad (Japan, Western Europe, United States), whereas 
Germany suffered under a sharp decline in demand. 85 
In the mid-nineties, the impacts of globalization became more and more apparent. 
Especially the Asian countries started playing an important role in matters of 
production and sales potential.  
                                                
82 Cf. Singleton (1992); p. 3 
83 Cf. VDA Report (1990); p. 27 
84 Cf. Becker (2006); pp. 1-3 
85 Cf. VDA Report (1993); pp. 16-18 
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In China, the government put great efforts in the development of transport 
infrastructure. The immense amount of potential customers and the continuing 
economic growth made the country very attractive for the automotive industry. 
Furthermore China needed the support of foreign car companies, because Chinese car 
manufacturer were not competitive yet, due to a lack of auto-making expertise. 
Besides, the Chinese government decreed, that car manufacturers must conclude a 
joint venture with a Chinese company, if they plan to set up a production plant in 
China. However, in the nineties, China was only relevant as sales market and 
production site.86 
India, Thailand and Taiwan also started arousing the interests of the automotive 
industry. Indeed the car density was still very low in those countries, but the sales 
volumes were increasing strongly.87 
All in all one can say, that the proportion of the triad markets of the global automotive 
demand started declining and the emerging and developing countries became 
increasingly important. Thus, the car manufacturers had to rethink their strategies and 
needed to implement local production facilities to bear the rising demand outside of 
the traditional markets. In the late nineties, the automotive companies continued the 
restructuring measures and concluded many mergers, fusions and collaborations. 
However, the automotive industry was in a good condition and reported increasing 
production and sales volumes. The OEMs even reached a historic high with 56 
million produced units in 1999.88 Although the Western European car manufacturers 
suffered under a recession in the mid-nineties, the companies had the biggest 
production volume worldwide in 1999. Furthermore 75 % of the produced cars were 
sold in the triad markets and the Chinese market pursued growing.89 
Slowly but surely the automotive industry emerged as an oligopolistic market. In 
1999, the five biggest car companies - General Motors, Ford, Toyota, 
DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen - manufactured 55 % of all the cars produced 
worldwide in the same year.90  
The global strategy of the leading car manufacturers implicated production plants all 
over the world, a global sourcing and allocation strategy, as well as a global product 
                                                
86 Cf. Becker (2006); pp. 3 
87 Cf. VDA report (1994-1995); p. 23 
88 Cf. VDA report (2000); p.15 
89 Cf. VDA report (2000); p.19 
90 Cf. VDA report (2000); p. 25 
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development strategy.91 This strategy allowed the companies to take advantage of 
growth markets and secure themselves against cyclical economic fluctuations and 
market-structure related fluctuations.  
Nevertheless, the car industry had to bear many challenges in the nineties.  The triad 
markets began to be saturated, the demands of the clients rose and the product life 
cycle decreased as well as the customer loyalty. As a result, the car manufacturers 
built more technical cars and expanded their product lines. This again led to an 
enormous increase in car-body variants and increasing R&D costs. At the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, the production of fuel-efficient and more environmentally-
friendly cars became increasingly important. The companies intensified the research 
efforts in different directions and made progresses in the development of diesel 
engines, hybrid and electric cars. 
From 2000 on, the cyclical trend in the automotive industry was very promising. The 
dismantling of tariff barriers, the facilitation of customs clearance and the reduction of 
non-tariff trade barriers facilitated global trade. Furthermore China became member 
of the WTO in 2003 and committed to comply with the international trading system's 
rules and its principles of non-discrimination, transparency, free trade and fair 
competition.92 In 2004, China was already the fifth largest car producer worldwide 
with 5,1 million units. In India the sales volumes surpassed for the first time one 
million units and the production volume ranged at 1,5 million produced cars.93 In 
Eastern Europe, the sales expectations could not be reached. However, countries like 
Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have become very attractive production 
locations in the past years due to low labour costs and the strategic location between 
Russia and Western Europe.  
Up to the financial crisis in 2008, the car manufacturers realized, due to their global 
strategies and the rising demand in emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia, Turkey, 
China and South East Asia, that they had to increase the production volumes. 
Although, the expectations could not be reached in some countries from year to year, 
the automotive industry managed to increase the number of produced units up to 
73,26 million units in 2007 (Illustration 1).94 
                                                
91 Cf. Shimokawa (1999); p. 1 
92 Cf. Centre for International Trade Development; 11.05.2012 
93 VDA report (2005); pp 37-38 
94 VDA reports (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007) 
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Illustration 1: Globally Produced Units per year 
  Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, own illustration  
The following illustration shows of the rising influence of the merging countries. As 
one can notice, the former triad markets – Western Europe, Japan and the United 
States – have lost in importance and the emerging countries Russia, China, India and 
Brazil with their global growth markets have gained in influence over the past years. 
 
Illustration 2: Global car production volume 2007 per region 
Source: VDA report 2008, own illustration 
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The financial crisis began in 2007 with the collapse of the subprime bubble in the 
United States. As a result, the car manufacturers had to suffer under massive collapses 
in growth, especially in countries like the United States, Spain or Great Britain, where 
the real estate and financial crisis hit the national economy very hard. The leading 
automotive industries – U.S.A., Japan and Germany - had to register the biggest 
decreases in production and a collapse of the sales volumes in 2008 and 2009. In the 
United States, the big three manufacturers Chrysler, Ford and General Motors had 
severe financial troubles and partly needed financial assistance by the American 
government to avoid bankruptcy. Furthermore the governments of the different 
countries tried to boost the economy by implementing different stimulus packages 
such as the car scrap page scheme in Germany.95 
The car manufacturers tried to stimulate the demand by granting bounteous discounts 
on newly acquired cars. Nevertheless, the demand for cars fell sharply and multiple 
factories had to be closed down, in other plants the production had to be stopped and 
temporary work was introduced. The U.S. car industry even underwent the worst sales 
volumes since 1992.  
The following figure shows the evolution of the production volume per year between 
2006 and 2010. As one can observe, the crisis hit the companies particularly in 2008 
and 2009. Only in 2010 the economy recovered slowly and a slight upturn began. 
 
 
Illustration 3: Evolution of the car production volume during the crisis I 
 Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, own illustration 
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While the triad markets suffered under strong decreases in demand, the dynamic 
growth ceased in the emerging markets. In 2008, India and China could not reach the 
rates of growth from the previous years. Nevertheless, the sales volumes kept on 
increasing. Brazil only had a decreasing production volume in 2009 (shown in 
Illustration 4). 
 
 
Illustration 4: Evolution of the production volume during the crisis II 
 Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, own illustration 
All in all, one must say, that the financial crisis hit the automotive industry less hard, 
then expected. Government incentives such as tax incentives and car-scrapping 
incentives pushed the car sales significantly. Furthermore, the markets in China, India 
and Brazil still performed very well. As a result, in 2009 the demand on the global 
markets decreased only by four per cent instead of the expected 20 per cent. Indeed 
the production volumes were still low, but the car manufacturers needed to liquidate 
their stocks in order to avoid further excess capacities.96 
Already in 2010, the production volumes were rising again and the recovery of the 
markets continued. The sales volume on the Chinese market exceeded all 
expectations. China managed to assure its position as largest car producer and most 
important sales market worldwide.  
Mainly the emerging markets were responsible for the strong market forecast. In 
Europe and the United States, the government incentives expired and the growth in 
demand slowed down. Nevertheless, the automotive industry succeeded to recover 
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much faster than expected and the global production volume attained again 71,1 
million units in 2010 and 80 million units in 2011. 
 
 
Illustration 5: Global car production from 2002 to 2011 
Source: International organisation of Motor vehicle Manufacturers, own illustration  
 
3.2 The future prospects of the automotive industry 
The financial crisis has shown that the power structure in the automotive industry has 
shifted. While the emerging countries were considered as important sales markets and 
production locations ten years ago, they have become the most important car 
producers and registered the largest sales volumes worldwide in the recent years. 
The industry needs to continue the structural change and has to bear tremendous 
challenges in the future. New competitors, mainly from Asia, are seeking to enter the 
market, the technological change to alternate drives must be mastered and the shift of 
the growth markets must be taken into account. At the same time customers’ needs 
and the mobility requirements are changing.97 
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According to Prof. Jürgen Hubbert, former member of the Board of Directors of 
DaimlerChrysler, the automotive industry has to face the greatest challenge in its 
history.98 
As already pointed out, the competitive landscape is changing and according to the 
predictions of several experts, China and India will emerge as global players in the 
industry and the rise of one global car company from China or India is more likely.99 
Furthermore production facilities in lower cost regions will become increasingly 
important, due to two reasons, cost and demand. Lower labour costs in emerging 
countries are one strong incentive to move the production to these regions. Moreover 
the population in the emerging markets is expanding and people desire the same 
standard of living as in the Western world. Consequently the number of potential 
clients is rising too.  
The OEMs need to show presence in the emerging markets for competitive and 
economic reasons. Due to high exchange volatility and rising transportation costs, the 
OEMs came to the conclusion, that regional production systems within a specific 
trade zone make more economic sense than importing outside of a trade zone. 
Therefore the car manufacturers will need to establish plants in low cost areas within 
a region. In this sense, cars for the European market are more likely to be produced in 
Hungary or Romania for instance and cars produced in Mexico will remain in North 
America.100 
The OEMs have to face another crucial challenge concerning the changing demands 
and customer expectations. On the triad markets the expectations are becoming more 
discerning. The consumers demand more individual cars including different 
entertainment features. As a consequence, the car manufacturers leave their niche and 
offer a wider product range, which again this leads to strong increases in product 
costs.101 According to a study of the Center of Automotive Research of the University 
of Duisburg-Essen, the German customer had the choice between 1.706 different 
vehicle variants out of 376 model lines in 2011. In 1995, 227 different model lines 
existed and the amount is expected to rise up to 415 model lines in 2015.102 
                                                
98 Cf. Thiem (2012) 
99 Cf. Becker (2006), p. 95; Thiem (2012); Zamponi (2011); 11.05.2012 
100 Cf. Deloitte (2009); pp. 3,4 
101 Cf. Becker (2006); p. 29 
102 Cf. Dudenhöffer; 11.05.2012 
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In the emerging countries, a very wide customer field demands for cheap compact 
cars like the Tata Nano from India, for example. Especially in mega cities like 
Mexico City, Guanghzou or Delhi small convenient cars will be indispensable. In this 
context, the car manufacturers also need to consider utilization concepts, like car 
sharing models.103 However, the middle class is growing in the developing world and 
the demand for luxury brands and high-end products will rise as well. According to 
Dudenhöffer, the R&D costs in this segment are increasing exponentially and the car 
manufacturers need to use global platforms to maintain an economically feasible and 
innovative production.104 
Higher fuel prices and the concerns over global warming have focused attention on 
more efficient cars and green technology. However, the development costs for electric 
and hybrid cars are still very high and only few customers are willing to pay a 
premium for these technologies. In addition, electric vehicles only have a limited 
range and the required infrastructure to charge the batteries lacks. Nevertheless a 
study by Deloitte estimates that by 2020, electric vehicles and other green cars will be 
representing up to a third of total global sales in developed markets.105 In Western 
countries, electric cars are the future. However, a lot depends on the progress in the 
development of cheap and powerful batteries and governmental incentives. If the 
government continues to support green emission-free technologies with tax 
concessions and subventions, electric and hybrid cars will much faster become widely 
accepted much faster. Furthermore, the government needs to provide the required 
infrastructures, such as charging stations, for example. 
In the emerging countries, the demand for traditional, internal combustion engines 
will probably dominate. First, fuel is less expensive than in Europe or Japan. Second, 
the largest purchasing segment in emerging markets by 2020 will be first–time buyers 
and prices remain the most important factor for them.106 However, the government 
policy also has a great influence. For instance, in Brazil the government boosts the 
adoption of flex fuel to relieve the country of its reliance on petroleum imports107. In 
China the government makes great efforts to become one of the leading producers of 
                                                
103 Cf. Thiem (2012) 
104 Cf. Dudenhöffer (2009); 11.05.2012 
105 Cf. Deloitte (2009); p. 15 
106 Cf. Deloitte (2009); p. 9 
107 Cf. United Nations Environment Programme; 11.05.2012 
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hybrid and electric vehicles in order to strengthen its competitive position and to 
reduce pollution in the mega cities.108 
However, as long as petrol is still affordable and the price for emission-free cars is 
that high, consumers will prefer traditional combustion engines. As a consequence, 
car manufacturers will try to reduce the mileage of diesel and gas engines 
significantly. Furthermore the R&D departments are working on new body 
components to make the cars lighter and more aero dynamical.109 Meanwhile, the 
companies need to keep an eye on development of alternative fuel. In Asia and Latin 
America, for instance the availability and easy access to natural gas favours the 
adoption of natural gas-powered vehicles.110 
All in all, the parallel development of petrol and gas engines, gas-powered vehicles, 
alternative propulsion, hybrid and electric cars is very expensive and complex. The 
companies need the financial resources and technical capacities to bear the challenges 
on many fronts. Hence, in times of structural changes and shifting growth markets, 
the OEMs are heading for tough times. 
3.3 The development of strategic alliances in the automotive 
industry 
In the following part, the evolution of collaborations, mergers and acquisitions within 
the automotive industry will be disclosed. The evolution of the automotive industry is 
described in chronological order and on specific examples and the motives for the 
different types of cooperation are illustrated. Subsequently, the results of the analysis 
are outlined and elucidated. 
The research data consists only of interactions between original equipment 
manufacturers only. However, alliances concerning the production of trucks, utility 
vehicles and buses are not considered in this survey. The data collected derives from 
different sources, such as Standard & Poor´s database Capital IQ, financial reports of 
the respective car manufacturers and different Internet sources, particularly websites 
of the different car companies. 
                                                
108 Cf. Deloitte (2009); p. 17 
109 Cf. Thiem (2012); 11.05.2012 
110 Cf. Deloitte (2009); p.19 
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In the 1980s, the car manufacturers recovered slowly from the oil crisis in the 1970s 
and started rethinking their strategies. At the beginning of the decade 30 independent 
car manufacturers existed, mostly from the U.S., Western Europe and Japan.111 As 
already mentioned, the Japanese companies were very effective in producing efficient 
cars at that time and posed a big threat to the American and European companies. 
Consequently these companies tried to gain the technological know-how through 
collaborations with Japanese manufacturers. Hence out of 18 alliances concluded 
between 1980 and 1990, eleven collaborations included at least one Japanese 
company (Table 1). 
The alliances were concluded for different reasons. For instance, many manufacturers 
put their development and production efforts together, to jointly produce cars and sell 
them under different brands. Kia, for example, concluded a license agreement with 
Mazda in 1983. This allowed them to produce Mazda derived vehicles for the South 
Korean market and foreign markets. Due to a collaboration with Ford, these cars were 
then rebadged and sold as Ford vehicles on the American markets. 
British car manufacturers such as Rover, Jaguar or MG had to get through troubled 
times in the 1970s because the companies were put under the control of the 
government. After a governmental restructuring program, the companies Austin and 
Rover formed the Austin Rover Group in 1981. Due to a collaboration agreement 
with Honda, the Japanese company supplied Austin Rover with cars in kit form, 
which were rebadged and sold as Rover cars. However, Austin Rover never managed 
to adopt the Japanese quality standard and manufacturing systems.112  
Moreover, the leading car manufacturer sought to enter new markets. In this context, 
VW and Ford decided to form a joint venture and merge their development and 
production facilities in Brazil. Through platforms, body parts and engines sharing, the 
two companies realized decreasing R&D and production costs.113 
Due to import restrictions, Japanese companies started opening production facilities in 
the U.S. For instance, Toyota reopened a former General Motors factory in 
cooperation with General Motors. The companies jointly produced cars and sold them 
under both brands. 
                                                
111 Cf. Becker (2006); p.77 
112 Cf. The Independent; 11.05.2012 
113 Cf. Yoshino (1996); p. 45 
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In the following table, one can observe, that joint production facilities, license 
agreements and collaborations of the production departments were very popular in the 
1980s. On one hand, these alliances were meant to get access to new markets. The 
foreign company shared the technologies and the know-how with the local company. 
In return the local manufacturer produced the vehicles and sold it under the different 
brands. As a result, the companies maintained production facilities together and 
jointly produced vehicles. These vehicles were often rebadged and sold under 
different brands. 
Volkswagen pursued three different strategies. First, due to a license agreement, 
Nissan produced vehicles for Volkswagen on the Japanese market and sold them with 
a VW and a Nissan badge. Second, Volkswagen concluded a collaboration with 
SEAT, which allowed them to jointly produce cars for the two brands in Spain. Three 
years later Volkswagen acquired 75 % of the share of SEAT and became the major 
shareholder of SEAT.114 
Moreover, Volkswagen concluded a joint venture with the Shanghai Automotive 
Industry Corporation (SAIC) in 1984. As a result SAIC started producing and selling 
VW cars from 1985 on in China. This joint venture is remarkable, because it shows 
that Volkswagen was one of the first car companies recognizing the enormous 
potential of the Chinese market. Furthermore it allowed them, to produce cars at very 
low production costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
114 Cf. Seat, S.A.; 11.05.2012 
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Company Nation Company Nation Year Motive 
GM USA Suzuki JPN 1981 Joint production facility  
Honda JPN Austin Rover GBR 1981 
Joint production cars (badge 
engineering)  
Nissan JPN VW GER 1981 
Car production / License agreement / 
Badge engineering 
Renault FR 
AMC (now 
Chrysler) USA 1981 
Joint production cars (badge 
engineering)  
Suzuki JPN Isuzu and GM JPN 1981 
Joint R&D and Production / 
Platform Sharing  
Mitsubishi JPN Proton MAS 1983 
 Joint production cars (badge 
engineering)  
SEAT SP VW GER 1983  Joint production cars  
Daihatsu JPN 
Tianjin Cars 
(FAW) CHN 1984 Car production / License agreement 
VW GER SAIC CHN 1984 Car production / License agreement 
GM USA Toyota JPN 1984 Joint production facility  
Daewoo KOR Nissan JPN 1986 
Joint production cars (badge 
engineering)  
Ford USA VW GER  1986 
Joint production facility on foreign 
market/ Badge engineering 
Ford USA Kia KOR 1986 
Joint production cars (badge 
engineering)  
Maserati IT Chrysler USA 1986 
Joint development & production one 
car  
Isuzu JPN 
Fuji Heavy 
Industries 
(Subaru) JPN 1987 
Joint production facility on foreign 
market 
Suzuki JPN Mazda JPN 1987 
Joint production cars (badge 
engineering)  
Suzuki JPN Daewoo KOR 1988 
Joint production cars (badge 
engineering)   
Rover  GBR Honda JPN 1989 
Joint production cars (badge 
engineering) 
  Table 1: Alliances between 1980 and 1989 
Source: Automotive Industry, own illustration 
 
As already mentioned, the British automotive industry had to pass troubled times. 
Therefore, the major shareholder of brands such as Rover, Austin, Jaguar or Aston 
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Martin changed several times in the 70s and 80s. Furthermore, Fiat acquired Alfa 
Romeo and SEAT became a subsidiary of the Volkswagen Group. 
The following table shows the different mergers and acquisitions from 1980 to 1989. 
 
Company Nation New Owner Nation Year 
MG (part of British Leyland) GB 
Rover Group 
(state owned) GB 1986 
Rover (part of British Leyland) GB 
Rover Group 
(state owned) GB 1986 
Alfa Romeo IT Fiat IT 1986 
Seat SP VW GER 1986 
Aston Martin GB Ford USA 1987 
JEEP GB Chrysler USA 1987 
Rover Group. GB British Aerospace GB 1988 
Jaguar GB Ford USA 1989 
 Table 2: Mergers & Acquisitions between 1980 and 1989 
Source: Automotive Industry, own illustration 
In the nineties the number of alliances increased and the car manufacturer started 
collaborating in very different matters. For instance, engines or platforms supply 
agreements came up as well as joint development projects. 
BMW delivered engines and body parts to Bentley and Rolls Royce throughout the 
whole decade. Both partners benefited of this collaboration. Rolls Royce and Bentley 
did not have the capacities to produce the engine on their own and BMW envisaged a 
much deeper collaboration. Thus, the engine supplying deal can be seen as the first 
stage of the merger that occurred nearly ten years later.  
Other companies, like Isuzu and Nissan for example, concluded a cross supply 
relationship in 1993. Both companies benefit of such agreements, because 
development costs decrease and each company can efficiently enhance its product 
line-up without incremental costs. 
Joint development projects also have the advantage of decreasing development costs. 
In this sense, PSA and Renault jointly developed a range of automatic gearboxes in 
1992. 
However, strategic alliances can also be used as a preliminary stadium of a merger or 
an acquisition. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Volkswagen tried to gain 
influence in Eastern Europe and concluded a joint venture with Skoda. Furthermore, 
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Volkswagen acquired a 30% stake of Skoda. Three years later Skoda became then a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Volkswagen. 
In many cases equity participations and cross shareholdings serve to deepen the 
alliance and lead to an acquisition of the weaker partner. The former collaborations 
between SEAT and Volkswagen as well as Skoda and Volkswagen are only two 
examples. 
Nevertheless, in some cases the alliance partners realize, that the partnership does not 
fit. The ending of the alliance is then much cheaper than the cancellation of a merger. 
Renault and Volvo started an alliance in 1990 with the intention of a subsequent 
merger. But Volvo’s shareholders successfully fought against these plans and the 
alliance had to be dismantled. As a consequence, the two partners stopped all joint 
projects and reversed their mutual equity participations.  
With the growing importance of the BRIC countries, the automotive manufacturers 
tried to enter the emerging markets. Countries such as China, India or Russia, were 
very attractive for the automotive industry due to the immense amount of potential 
customers and the continuing economic growth. However, most of the BRIC 
countries set up market entry restrictions in order to protect the local industry. For 
instance, foreign car manufacturers must conclude a joint venture with a local 
company, if they want to open a production facility in China. With the advancement 
of globalization in the nineties, more and more companies sought to enter joint 
ventures with Chinese companies. In this sense, seven major joint ventures were 
concluded between 1990 and 1999 with Chinese car manufacturers. The leading car 
companies such as Toyota, Volkswagen, General Motors, Ford, PSA and Daimler 
now sustained production facilities with local partners such as Dongfeng Motor 
Corporation, Beijing Automotive Group (BAIC), First Automobile Works (FAW) or 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC). The Chinese partner mostly 
produced the vehicles on behalf of the foreign companies. Mainly from 2000 on, 
many Chinese companies started producing their own production range.  
In India, the three local companies Tata Motors, Mahindra & Mahindra and Maruti 
Suzuki, which is a former joint venture between the Indian government and Suzuki 
Motors, concluded different joint ventures, with Daimler and Ford for instance. The 
concluded alliances between Western companies and partners from China or India 
always had a similar procedure. Both companies were equal partners and ran the 
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production facility together. The Western company provided the know-how and the 
technologies, whereas the local company provided the workforce. 
The following illustration shows which motives appeared how often in concluded 
alliances between 1991 and 2000. As one can see, the motives for strategic alliances 
became much more miscallaneous. Although entering new markets is still one of the 
main reasons for concluding, a partnership the form of the different alliances has 
changed. The OEMs are forced to conclude joint ventures in China and India. 
However, the alliances can rather be seen as license agreements because local 
manufacturers produce and sell the vehicles for their foreign counterparts. 
 
 
Illustration 6: Appearance of the collaboration motives in strategic alliances 
1999-2000 
Source: Automotive Industry, own illustration 
Furtermore one can observe that the number of alliances between equal partners 
increased. The OEMs needed to reduce their development and production costs. In 
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this sense the completion of joint development projects and plattform sharing became 
very popular. 
The automotive industry in the nineties was marked by two major happenings – 
BMW´s acquisition of the Rover Group and the merger of Daimler and Chrysler. 
In 1994, British Aerospace sold the Rover Group, which consisted of the Rover, Land 
Rover, MG, Austin and Morris brands, to BMW for £800 million.  
BMW was only represented in the large, executive and luxury car segment and 
wanted to widen the range of products in order to become more competitive. A make-
or-buy analysis had shown, that an acquisition would be more advantageous, than 
internal development. The Rover Group, with its small and medium-sized product 
range, should also simplify the attainment of new target groups. Furthermore BMW 
needed to expand to minimize the risk of being absorbed by another company. 
However, Rover´s product range was very old and the product range, including the 
different Rover, Land Rover, MGs and Minis, was strongly diverging. The cars had 
no common platforms and just a few common parts. This made it very difficult for 
BMW to achieve any economies of scale and Rover did not become profitable. In 
addition, a newly developed MG F and the Land Rover models stood in direct 
competition with BMW´s 5-series and X-series cars.115  
After years of losses, BMW´s chairman Bernd Pischetsrieder had to leave the 
company and in March 2000 BMW finally decided to break up the former Rover 
Group. Rover Cars and MG were sold to the Phoenix Consortium, Ford acquired 
Land Rover and BMW retained the rights to build the new MINI. 
The merger of Daimler and Chrysler in 1998 was supposed to be a merger of equals. 
Nevertheless the merger did not deliver the promised synergies and the integration of 
the two businesses did not succeed. In 2007, Chrysler, whose company value had 
decreased from $ 36 billion in 1998 down to $5,5 billion, was sold to the investment 
company Ceberus. 
At the end of the twentieth century, many car companies started rethinking their 
strategies. The companies pursued a global strategy and tried to gain influence by 
concluding new corporations or acquiring rival companies. A cutthroat competition 
took place and the car manufacturers sought to amplify their product range and 
increase their market share in order to remain competitive.  
                                                
115 Cf. The New York Times; 11.05.2012 
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Table 4 shows the different mergers and acquisitions in 1998 and 1999. As one can 
see the formation of just a few global automotive corporations, such as Volkswagen, 
General Motors or Toyota, proceeded. 
Company Nation 
Acquired 
Company Nation Year 
Daimler  GER Chrysler USA 1998 
Ford USA Volvo SWE 1999 
GM USA Isuzu JPN 1999 
Hyundai Motor Company KOR Kia KOR 1998 
Renault FRA Dacia  RO 1999 
Toyota JPN Daihatsu JPN 1998 
VW GER Bentley GB 1998 
VW GER Bugatti FR 1998 
VW GER Lamborghini IT 1998 
 Table 3: Mergers and Acquisitions in 1998 and 1999 
  Source: Automotive Industry, own illustration 
The following illustration shows the decrease in independent automotive 
manufacturers from 1980 on. The number of OEMs decreased considerably. From 
1991 to 2000, 18 different mergers or acquisitions occurred in the automotive 
industry. 
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Illustration 7: Concentration of automotive manufacturers 1980-2005 
  Source: Becker (2006), own illustration 
However, many companies, such as Renault and Nissan or GM, Suzuki, Isuzu and 
Subaru for instance, concluded strategic alliances to improve their competitive 
position. Especially after the failure of BMW’s acquisition of Rover and the failed 
merger of DaimlerChrysler, many companies hesitated of taking the financial risks of 
an acquisition. 
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The reasons and forms of the partnerships differed in many ways. In former 
partnerships, badge engineering was common, but the clients became more 
demanding and individuality became a relevant aspect when choosing a vehicle. 
Hence, the alliances concluded in the twenty-first century, rather comprised platform 
and engine sharing and joint purchasing agreements, joint development projects, 
production collaborations etc.  
 
 
Illustration 8: Collaboration motives in Strategic Alliances 2001-2011 
  Source: Automotive Industry, own illustration 
Illustration 11 gives a review of all the documented strategic alliances from 2001 to 
2011. One can observe, that three categories are of a rising importance.  
First, companies need to reduce costs and become more profitable. Due to the 
increasing expectations of the customers, the car companies are forced to widen their 
product range. In the eighties, one differed between eight different car segments. 
Nowadays, the OEMs need to abandon their niche and expand their product line-up. 
This led to an enormous increase of variants (Illustration 12). According to 
Dudenhöffer the number of different series will even increase from 376 in 2011 up to 
415 in 2015. 116 
                                                
116 Cf. Dudenhöffer; 11.05.2012 
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Illustration 9: Evolution of the variant diversity 1980-2011 
  Source: Becker (2006), own illustration 
Due to the evolution of the variant diversity, the conclusion of new collaborations 
became indispensable. Therefore, the number of joint development project, as well as 
platform, engine and technologies sharing agreements rose continuously. For 
instance, Daimler joined the Renault-Nissan alliance in 2010. The new partners 
agreed on sharing resources in four different areas: platforms for small cars, small 
petrol and diesel engines, technology for electric and hybrid vehicles and bigger 
diesel engines.117 
PSA concluded different joint development and production agreements with Toyota 
in 2002, Mitsubishi in 2005, BMW in 2006 and Ford in 2010. In recent years, the 
companies tended to arrange different partnerships with different OEMs. This allows 
the companies to exchange the technologies or products with the respective most 
specialized partner companies. 
In addition, the emerging markets of China, India and Russia gained even more 
influence. Especially in China, the number of joint ventures has risen considerably in 
                                                
117 Cf. The Economist; 11.05.2012 
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the past ten years. The leading car manufacturers are now all represented in China and 
sustain numerous production facilities in collaboration with local companies. 18 out 
of 73 collaborations concluded between 2001 and 2011 were joint ventures with 
Chinese companies. Thus, China has become the biggest car manufacturer and most 
important sales market in the world. All variants, from small sized to luxury cars, are 
produced and sold in China. 
Consequently, domestic car manufacturer like SAIC (brand name Roewe), Dongfeng, 
Chery, Brilliance or Geely gained the technological know-how and managed to 
increase their market share in China significantly. Furthermore, Chinese companies 
managed to increase their export rates considerably. The current largest foreign 
markets are South America and the Middle East.118 
In India, the companies Tata Motors and Mahindra & Mahindra sustain partnerships 
with leading Western car manufacturers. Maruti Suzuki is a former joint venture 
between Suzuki Motors and the Indian government and is currently the leading car 
manufacturer in India.  
In the recent years, the Chinese and Indian automotive industry has made substantial 
progresses and has started producing vehicles independently from Western partners. 
As a consequence, many car manufacturers started investing in production facilities in 
Russia. 
The alliance of AvtoVAZ and Renault as well as the joint venture of VW and GAZ 
are just two of six major cooperation agreements between one of the world’s leading 
car manufacturers and a domestic company. 
Altogether, the emerging markets of China, Russia and India have made a great 
development in the past eleven years. 26 out of 73 partnerships (36%) were concluded 
with companies from those countries. The car production volumes and the sales 
volumes have grown extensively. 
One can mostly observe the same development in China, India and Russia. First, a 
license agreement or joint venture between an external car manufacturer and a 
domestic company was concluded. The domestic company produced the vehicles and 
in some cases rebadged and sold them under different brands. At a certain point, the 
domestic companies had gained the specific knowledge and started producing their 
own cars. Some of these companies, such as Tata Motors, Geely or SAIC, became 
                                                
118 Cf. INAutonews; 11.05.2012 
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very successful, put great efforts in exporting the vehicles and can be seen slowly but 
surely as important rivals among the settled car manufacturers. 
Due to the rising concern about environmental pollution and global warming, the car 
manufacturers start building more fuel-efficient cars. Again, the development of the 
engines is very expensive and many of the joint development projects serve to 
develop fuel saving technologies. However, in the recent years, the companies have 
put the greatest efforts in developing hydrogen-powered and electric cars. 
Between 2008 and 2011, 35 strategic alliances were concluded. Eleven (31%) of these 
alliances focused on the development of hybrid and electric technologies. Moreover 
the leading global car manufacturers started concluding alliances among themselves, 
which was rather uncommon in the previous decades. Usually stronger companies 
sought for a weaker alliance partner. An explanation could be the decreasing number 
of independent car manufacturers and the fear of being acquired by a competitor. The 
cross-linking with other car manufacturers makes a hostile takeover more 
complicated. 
Illustration 13 shows the development of mergers and acquisitions compared to 
alliances from 1980 to 2011. One can observe, that in the nineties many mergers and 
acquisitions occurred. While VW was quite successful with its company integrations 
of Skoda, Bentley, Bugatti and Lamborghini, other fusions, like DaimlerChrysler and 
BMW Rover were not meant to be successful. According to Helmut Becker, a former 
top executive of BMW, after the failure of DaimlerChrylser and BMW Rover many 
companies favoured concluding alliances over mergers and acquisitions, because of 
the high financial risks.119  
 
 
                                                
119 Manager Magazin Online; 11.05.2012 
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Illustration 10: The Evolution of Corporate Affiliations 1980-2011 
  Source: Automotive Industry, own illustration 
This would also explain the rising number of alliances from 1998 on (Illustration 14). 
A restructuring of the markets took place and the car companies sought for different 
partners to bear the different challenges. During the last ten years, the respective 
integration mostly concerned indebted companies, like Land Rover or Volvo that 
already belonged to a larger portfolio of brands.120  
 
 
 
  
                                                
120 Manager Magazin Online; 11.05.2012 
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4. Empirical Analysis of the development of strategic 
alliances in the automotive industry 
After describing the different theoretical perspectives in chapter 2 and giving an 
overview of the development of the automotive industry in the past thirty years in 
chapter 4, this chapter serves to evaluate the influence of the theoretical perspectives 
on the decision making in practice.  
The transaction costs theory is the most quoted theory, when it comes to explain the 
conclusion of strategic alliances. Further, the Resource Based View and the Strategic 
Choice Perspective, as well as the portfolio theory, examine inter-firm collaborations 
from different angles and serve as solid explanatory approaches.  
The Transaction Costs Theory distinguishes between three different institutional 
arrangements – market, hierarchy and hybrid arrangements. Companies have to select 
between these forms in order to minimize the costs, such as transaction and 
production costs, and secure themselves against opportunistic behaviour by partners. 
Production costs vary according to learning and experience effects, location 
advantages and proprietary influences such as patents and trade secrets. Transaction 
costs include expenses associated with arranging managing and monitoring across 
markets and include costs for finding the right partner.121 
However, market transactions are often connected with high uncertainty leading to 
opportunistic behaviour and high transaction costs, whereas internalization can be 
very cost intensive, because the desired product or activity might be difficult and 
expensive to produce internally due to a lack of the required know-how. In this sense, 
a hybrid structure, e.g. strategic alliance, might be a good alternative, because it helps 
avoiding the problems of market and hierarchy structures. On the one hand, strategic 
alliances help avoiding opportunistic behaviour through equity investments and 
contractual safeguards.122 On the other hand, strategic alliances are advantageous, if 
the R&D and production costs are too high to produce or develop a product or service 
internally.   
In this sense, one could argue that strategic alliances are primarily concluded in order 
to reduce the production and transaction costs. 
                                                
121 Barringer & Harrison (2000); p. 369 
122 Judge & Dooley (2006); p. 27 
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Hypothesis 1: 
Although the automotive industry experienced a great development in the past thirty 
years, the major motive for the conclusion of alliances remains minimizing the 
transaction and production costs. 
 
The Transaction Costs Theory has been criticized for several reasons. For instance, 
the theory is restricted to the cost-minimization and efficiency problem. There are 
other reasons to form an alliance, such as learning or obtaining new technologies as 
well as entering new markets. Furthermore the Transaction Costs Theory disregards 
the different corporate cultures and the possibility of clashes caused because of the 
cultural differences.123 Furthermore, Das and Teng criticize that the value creation in 
alliances in neglected.124  
Another theoretical approach puts emphasis on exploiting and developing a firm’s 
resources, the Resource Based View. Penrose regarded a company as a bundle of 
resources, which had to be combined internally or with external partners in order to 
maximise long-term profits.125 Resources can be divided into three different groups – 
physical resources, human resources and organisational resources.126 
According to the RBV, companies enter strategic alliances to share, aggregate, 
combine or exchange resources with other companies, when these resources cannot be 
obtained efficiently through market transactions, fusions or acquisitions. Furthermore, 
strategic alliances should be favoured over mergers and acquisitions, because 
company generally do not want to acquire all the resources of another company. 
Through an alliance, the company only gets access to the desired resources. In 
addition, some of the less valuable resources in an acquisition cannot be easily 
dropped without taking a loss.127 In the automotive industry, intangible and tangible 
resources such as technological know-how or parts and engines are crucial for the 
success or the failure of a company. Therefore the acquisition or exchange of desired 
resources pose the principal reason for the conclusion of strategic alliances. 
 
 
                                                
123 Cf. Barringer & Harrison (2000); p. 372 
124 Cf. Das & Teng (2000); p. 56 
125 Cf. Rugman & Verbeke (2001); p. 769 
126 Cf. Tsang (1997); p. 208 
127 Cf. Das & Teng (2000); p. 37 
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Hypothesis 2: 
The acquisition and exchange of needed resources is crucial for the success of a 
company, even if the exchanged resources changed greatly over the past thirty years. 
Therefore the Resource Based View rather serves as a theoretical explanatory 
approach of strategic alliances, than the Transaction Costs Theory. 
 
However, the Resource Based View disregards the decision-process, whether 
companies should choose between market transaction, an inter-firm cooperation or 
internalization to obtain the needed resources. Furthermore, the Resource Based View 
does not examine how the company resources are developed. The theory simply 
concentrates on the need for critical resources and the necessity to exchange them.128  
The Strategic Choice Perspective elucidates strategic alliances from a very different 
angle. This theory, elaborated by John Child in 1972129, focuses on the strategic 
choice made by a company’s decision-makers in order to reach certain objectives, 
such as increased market power or increasing sales volumes. 
According to Child, a company’s top executives define the future goals or objectives 
after evaluating the company’s position. The choice of goals, e.g. entering new 
markets, is than reflected in the strategic action of the company130. Thereby, the 
company needs to respond to external environmental conditions and adapt their 
strategic action to given local conditions.131 
In other words, many automotive companies try to enter new markets to increase their 
market power and record greater sales volumes. However, many countries, especially 
emerging countries, set up market entry barriers in order to protect the local economy. 
As a response, the OEMs conclude strategic alliances, mostly joint ventures, with 
local car manufacturers to evade the restrictions. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
In order to gain greater market power, managers seek to enter new markets. Due to 
external environmental conditions, such as market entry barriers, the formation of 
strategic alliances is a major expansion tool of multinational companies. 
                                                
128 Cf. Barringer & Harrison (2000); p. 374 
129 Cf. Child (1972); p. 2 
130 Cf. Child (1972); p. 17 
131 Cf. Judge & Zeithaml (1992); p. 770 
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However, the strategic choice perspective is very broad and not elaborated yet. 
Moreover the motivations to conclude an alliance, which are elaborated in many other 
perspectives, such as the Transaction Cost Theory, the Game Theory or the Resource-
based View could also be incorporated in the Strategic Choice Perspective.132 
Furthermore, many authors criticize, that alliance structures are affected by 
executives` personnel perceptions. This makes it difficult to comprehend the 
conclusion of strategic alliances from a theoretical point of view. 
Thus, strategic alliances can also be analysed on the basis of a financial perspective, 
the Modern Portfolio Theory. The MPT says that through greater diversification in an 
investment portfolio, the financial risk of unexpected losses is lowered. A diversified 
investment portfolio of various assets with different levels of risks leads to a 
diversification of risk of unexpected losses, as well as more secure and consistent 
cash flows. 
Car-manufacturing companies can diversify the risk of failure on two different levels. 
First, the OEMs should conclude different partnerships with other car manufacturing 
companies. This reduces the risk of extensive financial losses if one partnership fails. 
Besides, the financial risk of strategic alliances is much lower than mergers or 
acquisitions. In addition, companies should diversify their product range. However, 
entering new segments is very cost-intensive. Therefore companies should spread the 
financial risk and cooperate with other car manufacturers. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  
Strategic alliances are concluded to reduce the financial risk of company's ambitions 
to reach a wider product diversification, as well as, different partnerships reduce the 
risk of a cost-intensive failure. 
4.1 Research methods 
As empirical data I used the collected data of strategic alliances, mergers and 
acquisitions of the automotive industry. As already mentioned, I took a sample of 68 
car companies and analysed, if they were acquired, merged or concluded alliances 
                                                
132 Barringer & Harrison (2000); pp. 375 
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with other companies. Twelve companies are sub brands of global car manufacturers 
without any discrete collaboration, so they were excluded from the survey. 
The research data was collected through different sources such as Standard & Poor´s 
database Capital IQ, financial reports of the respective car manufacturers and 
different Internet sources, particularly websites of the different car companies. 
Furthermore only horizontal alliances between car manufacturers were analysed. 
Collaborations concerning trucks, buses or utility vehicles are not included in the 
survey. 
In order to analyse the hypotheses, I analysed 125 captured alliances on their motives 
and assigned at least one motive to every concluded alliance. Therefore I used the 
main motives for strategic alliances elaborated by Faulkner and Child and added the 
categories “Resources exchange” and “Market entry barriers”. The different motives 
refer to the described theoretical approaches, which allowed me to examine which 
alliance can be explained by which theory. 
Respectively, one motive refers to the Transaction Costs Theory and the Modern 
Portfolio Theory, whereas two motives refer to the Strategic Choice Perspective and 
the Resource Based View (Illustration 14). This enables me to analyse the different 
motives of strategic alliances on the one hand. On the other hand, the results show to 
what extent strategic alliances are explainable through the different theories and to 
comprehend which motives were crucial in the different alliance formations over the 
years. In this sense, Mitsubishi and Guanghzou concluded a strategic alliance in 2010 
in order to jointly produce vehicles in China. Hence, the alliance was concluded for 
several reasons. On the one hand, the Chinese car manufacturer was mainly interested 
in concluding the partnership to gain Mitsubishi’s technological know-how. On the 
other hand the alliance was a consequence of Mitsubishi’s ambitions to enter the 
Chinese market and the Chinese market entry barriers. Thus, the Resource Based 
View (obtaining new technologies) and the Strategic Choice Perspective (market 
entry barriers, entering new markets) serve as explanatory approaches for the 
conclude partnership.  
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Illustration 11: Motives for the conclusion of strategic alliances 
Source: Own illustration 
 
The different motives are divided into the following categories: 
- Cost minimization (TCT): this category refers to the cost minimization that 
can be obtained through rationalization and economies of scale. For instance, 
companies lower their expenses by combining their R&D efforts or by 
acquiring tangible assets from partner companies, which allows them to save 
the development, production and transaction costs. 
- Reduce the financial risk (MPT): the development and production of a new 
product or technology is very expensive. The collaboration with one or more 
partners reduces the costs and so the risk of high financial losses. 
- Obtaining a new technology (RBV): technologies can be gained through joint 
R&D projects, technology and engines supply agreements, joint production 
facilities or license agreements. 
- Resources exchange (RBV): as described in the Resource Based Theory, 
companies can be seen as a collection of resources. Thus, companies form 
alliances to exchange needed resources. The category includes tangible assets 
such as equipment, finished and semi-finished goods. 
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- Strategic action / entering new markets (SCP): this category refers to strategic 
alliances that were concluded in order to enter new markets. The conclusion of 
the partnership is a strategic choice made by a company’s decision-makers. 
 
The following table serves as an overview of the different theories and to clearly 
distinguish the different approaches and the respective motives.  
 
 
Table 4: Overview over the different theoretical approaches 
Source: Own composition 
4.2 Results 
The elaboration of the hypotheses has shown, that 77 % of all the strategic alliances 
had the minimization of transaction and production costs as major motivation. 
Furthermore, 74% of the collaborations had the sharing of tangible resources as main 
objective. Moreover, “Obtaining new technologies” and “Reducing the financial risk” 
appeared in 71,5%, respectively 55% of the alliances as motivation factors. The 
governmental obligation of creating a joint venture played a decisive role in only 25% 
of the alliances.  
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SCP RBV TCT MPT RBV SCP 
 
Strategic 
actions/ 
entering new 
markets 
Obtaining 
new 
technologies 
Cost min. 
(Trans. / 
Prod.) 
Reduce 
Fin. Risk 
Sharing 
tangible 
resources 
Market-
entry 
barrier  
1980-1990 50,0% 61,1% 88,9% 50% 88,9% 27,8% 
1991-2000 51,5% 60,6% 78,8% 54,5% 75,6% 21,2% 
2001-2011 44,4% 79,2% 73,6% 55,6% 69,4% 26,4% 
Total 47,2% 71,5% 77,2% 54,5% 74,0% 25,2% 
Table 5: Occurrence of the different motives in strategic alliances 
  Source: Automotive Industry, own calculations 
 
As one can see in table 4, the dispersion of the different motives remains quite stable 
over the three decades. However, the motive “Sharing resources” decreases 
significantly over time. The reason is that in the nineteen eighties strategic alliances 
were primarily concluded to jointly produce cars. The vehicles were then rebadged 
and sold under different brands. At that time product diversification was not that 
important yet and the consumers’ desire for individuality was not elaborated yet. 
However, the development and production costs were already immense. As a 
consequence, many car manufacturers combined their resources and jointly produced 
cars, in order to safe development and production costs. The cars were then sold in 
different countries under different brands.  
The importance of minimizing costs also slightly decreased, even though three out of 
four alliances were concluded between 2001 and 2011 to reduce transaction and 
production costs. 
Furthermore, one can observe that “Obtaining new technologies” has become much 
more significant over the past 10 years. First, the conclusion of joint ventures between 
Chinese companies and foreign partners increased considerably. Chinese companies 
conclude these alliances mainly to obtain their partners know-how. Second, the 
development of new technologies for hybrid and electric vehicles has become very 
important in the recent years.  
The rate of alliances concluded to promote diversification remained constant over the 
whole period. Further, the motivation to enter new markets has not varied over the 
past thirty years. One could rather observe, that in the eighties, mostly companies 
from Japan sought to enter the Western European and the U.S. markets. From 1990 
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on, emerging markets such as South America, China, Russia and India, have become 
increasingly important. 
Analysing the data from the different theoretical perspectives, one notices, that 97,6% 
of the alliances could be comprehended by applying the Resource Based View. 
Nevertheless, also 77,2% of the alliances are comprehensible through the Transaction 
Costs Theory. Only 47,2% of the alliances appear reasonable, when one considers the 
conclusion of an alliance only from the Strategic Choice Perspective and 54,5% of the 
concluded alliances are comprehensible by the means of the Diversification Theory 
(Table 5). 
 
  Strategic 
Choice 
Perspective 
Resource 
Based 
View 
Transaction 
Costs 
Theory 
Portfolio 
Theory   
  
1980-1990 50,0% 100,0% 88,9% 50,0% 
1991-2000 51,5% 100,0% 78,8% 56,9% 
2001-2011 44,4% 95,8% 73,6% 55,6% 
Total 47,2% 97,6% 77,2% 54,5% 
Table 6: The Explicability of strategic alliances from the perspective of the 
different theoretical approaches 
  Source: Automotive Industry, own calculations 
 
Although, the Resource Based View and the Transaction Costs Theory seem to be 
solid explanatory approaches, this also illustrates the need of examining strategic 
alliances from different angles. 
Having a look at the first hypothesis, one notices that, the Transaction Costs Theory 
serves as very decent explanatory approach for the conclusion of strategic alliances, 
as 77,2% of the captured alliances could be explained by the means of the TCT. 
However, the Resource Based View (Hypothesis 2) even serves as an explanatory 
approach for 97,6% of the concluded alliances. Therefore the RBV seems to be more 
appropriate to reason the conclusion of strategic alliance. Nevertheless, many authors, 
such as Eric Tsang for instance, argue that both theories should be used 
complementarily to analyse strategic alliances.133   
                                                
133 cf. Tsang (2000); p. 215 
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From the point of view of the Strategic Choice Perspective, it is proven to be true that 
many alliances can be seen as strategic action in order to enter new markets and to 
evade market entry barriers. However, the theory can only be applied in 47,2% of the 
captured alliances and the theory rather serves as an explanatory approach for 
strategic alliances in emerging markets. 
Even though the Modern Portfolio Theory is widely used in the financial sector, the 
theory could only be applied in 54,5% of the captured partnerships as an explanatory 
approach. The theory seems to be rather useful in matters of portfolio management in 
the financial sector, than for general inter-firm collaborations. 
The analysis of the collected data demonstrates that most alliances are concluded for 
several reasons and could be analysed by the means of different theoretical 
approaches. Therefore, I analysed, if there is any correlation between the different 
motives. On one hand, the analysis reveals that there is a connection between the 
different motives of a respective theoretical approach. On the other hand, this allows 
detecting if there are combinations of different motives, which are more likely to 
appear than others. 
 
 
SCP RBV TCT PFT RBV SCP 
 
Growth 
strategies/entering 
new markets 
Obtaining new 
technologies 
Cost 
minimization 
(R&D) 
Reduce 
Financial 
risk  
Sharing 
tangible 
resources 
Market-entry 
barrier 
 
Growth 
strategies/entering 
new markets 
1 0,191 -0,508 -0,410 -0,494 0,619 
Obtaining new 
technologies 
0,191 1 -0,255 -0,339 -0,176 0,295 
Cost minimization 
(R&D) 
-0,508 -0,255 1 0,572 0,880 -0,829 
Reduce Financial 
risk  
-0,410 -0,339 0,572 1 0,519 -0,498 
Sharing tangible 
resources 
-0,494 -0,176 0,880 0,519 1 -0,798 
Market-entry 
barrier 
0,619 0,295 -0,829 -0,498 -0,798 1 
  Table 7: Correlation matrix of the different motives 
     Source: Automotive Industry, own calculations 
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SCP RBV TCT PFT RBV SCP 
 
Growth 
strategies/entering 
new markets 
Obtaining 
new 
technologies 
Cost 
minimization 
(R&D) 
Reduce 
Financial risk  
Sharing 
tangible 
resources 
Market-entry 
barrier 
 Growth 
strategies/entering 
new markets 
  3,329% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 
Obtaining new 
technologies 3,329%   0,412% 0,011% 4,976% 0,084% 
Cost minimization 
(R&D) 0,000% 0,412%   0,000% 0,000% 0,000% 
Reduce Financial 
risk  0,000% 0,011% 0,000%   0,000% 0,000% 
Sharing tangible 
resources 0,000% 4,976% 0,000% 0,000%   0,000% 
Market-entry 
barrier 0,000% 0,084% 0,000% 0,000% 0,000%   
 
p < 5% p < 1% p < 0,1% 
Table 8: Levels of significance of the different motives 
     Source: Automotive Industry, own calculations 
 
The motives “Sharing tangible resources” and “Cost minimization” are strongly 
correlated. This shows us, that it is very probable, that the two motives were 
considered in the conclusion of the same alliance. Besides these two motives, also 
appear in around 80% of the alliances. The fact that the two motives refer to two 
different theoretical perspectives strengthens the assumption, that strategic alliances 
must be examined from different angles.  
Moreover, “Sharing tangible resources” and “Reduce financial risk” are correlated. 
Obviously, companies save R&D expenses, when they exchange the needed resources 
with an alliance partner, which again diminishes the financial risk.  
Furthermore, “Entering new markets” and “Market entry barriers” are strongly 
correlated. This results, from the fact, that many emerging markets sustain entry 
barriers, in order to protect the local economy. The motives “Cost minimization” and 
“Reduce financial risk” are also strongly correlated. However, this is not surprising, 
because both motives are strongly related.  
Finally one can observe, that some motives are strongly positively correlated, whereas 
other motives are strongly negatively correlated, e.g. “Market entry barrier” and “Cost 
minimization”. This tells us, that the same compositions of motives appear 
consistently.  
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All the correlations were tested on their significance (Table 8). The p-values are all 
below 5%. This means that the relationships between the different motives are highly 
significant. 
To conclude one can say that strategic alliances should be examined on the basis of 
different theoretical approaches. The cost-minimization factor is as important as the 
development and exploitation of the companies’ resources. In future, OEMs need to 
further increase their product range, develop new technologies and improve the 
existing technologies. As a consequence, companies need to share and exchange 
resources to master the different challenges. Thus, inter-firm collaboration lead to an 
allocation of the financial risk and a minimization of the development and transaction 
costs. In addition, the companies need to enter new markets to reach more customers.  
 
Illustration 12: Interaction of the different motives for the conclusion of strategic 
alliances 
Source: Own illustration 
 
Strategic alliances must be elaborated on the basis of different theoretical approaches, 
mainly from the Resource Based View and the Transaction Costs Theory. Each 
collaboration is concluded for several reasons. Thereby same combinations of motives 
appear consistently. The motives do not mutually exclude each other, but it is rather 
an interaction of the different motives (Figure 12). 
 
 
 
Interrelated  
Issues 
SCP     
Market-
entry barrier SCP      
Growth 
strategies/
entering new 
markets 
RBV 
Obtaining new 
technologies RBV     
Sharing 
tangible 
ressources 
TCT            
Cost 
minimization 
(R&D) 
PFT     
Reduce 
Financial 
risk  
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4.3 Further reflections 
Although, the Resource Based View and the Transaction Costs Theory proved to be 
very solid explanatory approaches, there exist other variables that influence the 
conclusion of strategic alliances in the automotive industry, such as the number of 
competitors or the economic situation.  
High competition entices companies to conclude partnerships in order to get access to 
resources and share costs and risks.134 The number of independent car manufacturers 
has decreased in the past years, whereas competition, as well as the operational 
requirements for the automotive companies, have become more demanding. 
Thus, the rate of alliance formations has increased, with a decreasing number of 
competitors. According to my findings, the number of competitors has decreased from 
thirty companies down to only twelve independent car manufacturers, whereas the 
rate of new alliance formations has constantly increased (Illustration 15). 
 
 
Illustration 13: The relation between alliance formations and the number of 
independent car manufacturers 
  Source: Automotive Industry, own illustration 
 
From a statistical point of view, both variables - the number of competitors and the 
rate of alliance formations - are strongly negatively correlated (-0,718). However, the 
significance level is above 5%, namely 11%, which means that the decreasing number 
                                                
134 Cf. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1996); p. 138 
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of independent car manufacturers does not serve as the only solid explanatory 
approach for the rising number of alliance formations.  
Nevertheless, the automotive industry has emerged over the past twenty years to an 
oligopolistic market. Oligopolistic markets are marked by differentiated product, high 
production and fierce competition. Hence, companies tend to conclude alliances to 
bear the rising R&D and production costs. From a Resourced Based View, one could 
argue that companies need to conclude alliances to get access to the rising amount of 
needed resources. Many experts of the automotive industry argue, that the cutthroat 
competition between the car manufacturers and the restructuring of the market are 
responsible for the diminishment of independent car manufacturers. The competition 
between the few OEMs becomes stronger and the companies close ranks. To remain 
competitive and innovative the companies need to cooperate. Furthermore, smaller 
car manufacturers conclude alliances to avoid being acquired by a stronger competitor 
and to secure their market power.135 
In addition, the industry’s economic situation has an influence on the rate of alliance 
formations. In years of a cyclical upturn, car manufacturers want to utilize the positive 
trend to expand and grow. Especially companies, whose home market suffers under a 
downturn, are interested in gaining or increasing influence on growth markets.  
I used the international production statistics from the International Organisation of 
Automobile Manufacturers136 in order, to evaluate if the automotive market was 
growing or remained static. The correlation analysis shows, that there is a connection 
between the state of the global automotive market and the formation of alliances. The 
correlation amounts to 0,674, which can be defined as medial correlation. The 
significance level of the correlation amounts to 10%.  Again the yearly produced units 
seem to be a good indicator for the rate of alliance formations, but they do not serve 
as solid explanatory approach. The following illustration serves to illustrate the 
findings. 
 
                                                
135 Cf. Manager Magazin Online; 11.05.2012 
136 Cf. International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers; 11.05.2012 
 60 
 
 
 
Illustration 14: Correlation between the production volumes and the rate of 
alliance formations 
  Source: Automotive Industry, own illustration 
 
On the one hand, this result shows that in times of economic upswing, the car 
manufacturers rather conclude inter-firm collaborations, than in times of declining 
markets. Probably, the companies avoid the high financial risk during a cyclical 
downturn. Furthermore, the process of forming a strategic alliance is very time-
consuming and expensive, which holds the company from cooperating with other 
OEMs. 
On the other hand, one could argue, that in times of stagnating markets, the 
companies must try to enter other markets, mainly the emerging markets. Especially 
since 49% of the documented alliances between 2000 and 2011 comprehend one 
partner from a mature market and one partner with an emerging market as home 
market. However, the correlation analyses showed, that there is no connection 
between the growth and decline of the respective home-markets of the alliance 
partners. 
In general, one must say, that the decreasing number of independent OEMs and the 
yearly produced units serve as indicators for the rate of alliance formations, but not as 
solid explanatory approaches. 
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5. Conclusion and Future prospects 
This thesis dealt with the development of strategic alliances in the automotive 
industry. A wide range of inter-firm collaborations can be characterized as strategic 
alliances. In general, one considers a partnership of at least two companies that work 
together to achieve strategically significant objectives, which are beneficial for each 
partner, as a strategic alliance.137  
In literature, one distinguishes mostly between non-equity alliances, equity alliances 
and joint ventures. Non-equity alliances are contractual agreements such as joint 
development or production agreements, whereas equity alliances are characterized by 
partial or mutual equity investments in the partner company. Joint ventures are 
independent entities created by the cooperating companies. The equity shares are 
either distributed equally, e.g. 50-50 joint ventures, or one partner possesses a 
controlling interest, e.g. unequal joint venture.   
Even though, joint development projects and parts supplying agreements occur 
frequently in the automotive industry, most partnerships are consolidated through 
joint ventures or strengthened through equity investments. In other cases, mainly in 
emerging markets, the governmental policy requires the formation of a joint venture, 
if a foreign company wants to enter the local market, in order to promote the local 
economy and to gain the technological know-how. 
Although, there are many reasons for the formation of an alliance, seven major 
motives emerge from the different theoretical approaches: 
• Growth strategies and entering new markets 
• Achieve a competitive advantage 
• Reduce the financial risk 
• Cost minimization (production and transaction costs) 
• Obtain new technologies 
• Exchange resources 
• Market-entry barriers 
Regarding the automotive industry, one can formulate more specific motives, such as 
badge engineering, engines and parts supplying, platform sharing, as well as the 
                                                
137 Cf. Elmuti & Kathawala (2001); p. 206 
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development of new technologies or joint production facilities. However, in practice 
the motives can all be derived from the theoretical approaches. 
Although many companies favour inter-firm collaborations to pursue their expansion 
strategies, this expansion form also bears a few important risks. Das and Teng 
differentiate between relational risk and performance risk.138 The analysis of the 
empirical data has shown that many alliances failed for one of these reasons. Either 
the companies did not managed to establish a trustful relationship driven by any 
opportunistic means, or the alliances failed due to external reasons, such as economic 
recession or fierce competition. The lack of competence of one partner, as well as 
insurmountable cultural differences emerged as further common reasons for failure. 
The analysis of the economic development of strategic alliances gives a first 
indication on the development of alliance formations from 1980 on. In the nineteen 
eighties the automotive industry was dominated by companies from Western Europe, 
Japan and the United States. However, the Japanese companies gained in influence 
due to technological superiority. In the nineteen nineties, the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the upcoming globalization, enabled the automotive companies to get access to 
emerging markets such as Brazil, Argentina or Russia. While the triad markets 
remained static, the production and sales potential in the developing and emerging 
countries was enormous. In the late nineties, the global car industry was in a 
restructuring process and a few crucial mergers were concluded and the automotive 
industry became an oligopolistic market.  
By 2005, China was already the fifth largest car producer in the world and India 
realized the need to increase its’ car production volume constantly. The triad markets 
lost considerable influence, whereas the BRIC countries were now firmly established 
in the market. 
During the financial crisis, the leading automotive industries - U.S.A., Japan, 
Germany and South Korea – had to register huge decreases in production. However, 
the increasing sales volumes in China, India and Brazil prevented an even greater 
crisis of the automotive industry. From 2010 on, the markets started recovering and 
the global production volumes increased rapidly in 2010 and 2011. 
The analysis of the empirical data has shown, that the economic evolution of the 
different countries serves as an indicator for the conclusion of strategic alliances. 
                                                
138 Cf. Das & Teng (1999); p. 51 
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Hence, American and European companies favoured concluding strategic alliances 
with Japanese companies in the nineteen eighties to get access to their technological 
know-how. On the other side, the Japanese companies sought to enter new markets. 
The main motive for the conclusion of an alliance was badge engineering. This 
allowed the companies to receive the needed resources to produce cars and to reduce 
the R&D costs. In the nineteen nineties, the rate of alliance formations increased 
considerably. Further the motives for alliance conclusions became more multifaceted. 
For instance, the companies jointly developed engines and platforms and concluded 
cross supply or platform sharing agreements. Moreover many alliances included 
mutual equity investments, as a response to a rising number of mergers and 
acquisitions in the late nineties. In addition, most car manufacturers were aware of the 
rising importance of the emerging markets and joint ventures with Chinese partner 
companies increased considerably. 
At the beginning of the twenty first century, a cutthroat competition had begun. The 
number of thirty independent car manufacturers in 1980 decreased down to only 
twelve independent OEMs in 2005. However, due to the failures of BMW-Rover and 
DaimlerChrysler, the companies dread the risks of acquiring a competitor and 
strategic partnerships became increasingly important. Thereby most alliances were 
concluded to get access to the Chinese market, to jointly develop electric and hybrid 
technologies, as well as to share technologies and platforms. 
During the financial crisis, the formation of alliances decreased significantly.  
However, with the cyclical upturn in 2010, the rate of alliance formations increased 
again considerably.  
In future the car manufacturing companies are facing many challenges. First, hybrid 
and electric technologies, as well as the traditional combustion engines still need to be 
improved. Second, the major car companies must handle the shift of the growth 
markets and the market entrance of new competitors mainly from China and India. 
Although Chinese car companies still have to improve the quality and safety of their 
cars, Indian manufacturers are already strongly represented on the global market and 
both countries will slowly but surely emerge as global players in the industry. 
The OEMs need to show presence in the emerging markets, for economics and 
competitive reasons. Hence production facilities must be opened up in these regions. 
Furthermore customer demands are changing considerably. In the emerging countries, 
the upper class seeks for luxury vehicles. In addition, the demand for low price 
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compact cars is rising too, due to a growing middle class.  In the Western countries, 
the customers seek for more individuality, which forces the car industry to offer a 
wider product range. 
In order to master these challenges, the car manufacturers need to reduce the R&D 
and production costs. Furthermore, inter-firm collaborations are indispensable to get 
access to needed resources. 
The Transaction Costs Theory refers to the need of decreasing the production as well 
as the transaction costs. The Resource Based View however, claims that strategic 
alliances are concluded to acquire obtain needed resources. The empirical analysis has 
proven that both theories serve as very solid explanatory approaches. Further, 
“Minimizing the transaction and production costs” and “Sharing tangible resources” 
are the major motives for the conclusion of strategic alliances. However, one must not 
neglect that strategic alliances are also concluded for strategic and legal reasons. 
Moreover, the analysis has shown, that alliances are always concluded for various 
purposes and need to be examined from different theoretical angles. Nevertheless, it 
seems as if different car manufacturing companies are pursuing the same expansion 
strategies with a combination of the same motives repetitively. In this context a 
survey under top executives in the automotive industry would be meaningful in order 
to find out if the company had any of the theoretical approaches in mind when 
concluding a partnership. 
In addition, the rate of strategic alliances increased steadily, while the number of 
competitors decreased. The change into an oligopolistic market, the rising 
competition and the threat of being acquired enticed the companies to conclude 
alliances, whereas the financial risk deterred the companies from acquiring strong 
competitors. Furthermore, in times of economic upswing, the car manufacturers are 
rather willing to conclude strategic partnerships. This can be explained by the fact, 
that in general, companies are rather pursuing expansion strategies during a cyclical 
upturn.  
For the future one can expect, that the conclusion of alliances will further increase. 
The companies need to collaborate with different partners to guarantee long-term 
success. Although there currently exist only eleven independent car manufacturers, 
one can expect, that in the next years another global player from India and from China 
will emerge. With the intensification of competition, the hunt for resources and the 
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need of reducing costs will continue. However, with the increase in equity alliances, 
the chance for a renewed wave of mergers persists. 
Although, the OEMs are very communicative concerning their successful 
partnerships, it is very difficult to find any information on failed alliances. On the one 
hand, the companies do not want to reveal their own shortcomings. On the other hand, 
the OEMs do not want to name and shame their former partners, because they still 
want to be considered as an attractive alliance partner for future projects. In this 
thesis, the research is limited on the motives for the formation of inter-firm 
partnerships. However, it would be very interesting to analyse the durability of 
strategic alliances and the reasons for their failure. Why are some partnerships 
doomed to failure, whereas other companies sustain several well-functioning 
collaborations? In this context, it might be interesting to compare the companies’ 
different cultural backgrounds and their influence on inter-company partnerships. 
In addition, the survey only considered alliances between OEMs. The role of the 
automotive suppliers was neglected, although the rising number of strategic alliances 
leads to a reduction of needed resources, which again leads to a decline in demand 
and increasing competition on the suppliers’ side. Thus, it would be interesting to 
analyse the implications for the automotive suppliers. 
Finally, it would be of interest to analyse, the rate of strategic alliances that ended in 
mergers or acquisitions. After the failure of DaimlerChrysler and BMW-Rover, the 
OEMs avoided taking over rival companies and therefore concluded strategic 
alliances with important mutual equity investments. In this sense it is exciting to 
observe, if the recently concluded alliances serve as primary stage for future mergers 
or, if the era of strategic alliances truly has begun. 
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Appendix 
List of the concluded strategic alliances, mergers and 
acquisitions 
Strategic alliances 1980-1989 
 
Company Company Year Description 
GM Suzuki 1981 Joint production facility 
Honda Austin Rover 1981 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Nissan VW 1981 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Renault AMC (now Chrysler) 1981 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Suzuki Isuzu and GM 1981 Joint R&D and Production / Platform Sharing 
Mitsubishi Proton 1983 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
SEAT VW 1983 Joint production cars 
Daihatsu Tianjin Cars (FAW) 1984 Chinese JV / Car production /License agreement 
VW SAIC 1984 Chinese JV / Car production /License agreement 
GM Toyota 1984 Joint production one car (badge engineering) 
Daewoo Nissan 1986 Joint production one car (badge engineering) 
Ford VW 1986 
Joint production facility on foreign market/Badge 
engineering 
Ford Kia 1986 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Maserati Chrysler 1986 Joint development and production one car 
Isuzu 
Fuji Heavy Industries 
(Subaru) 1987 Joint production facility on foreign market 
Suzuki Mazda 1987 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Suzuki Daewoo 1988 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Rover  Honda 1989 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions 1980-1990 
 
Company 
Acquired 
Company Year 
Rover Group MG 1986 
Rover Group Rover 1986 
Fiat Alfa Romeo 1986 
VW Seat 1986 
Ford Aston Martin 1987 
Chrysler JEEP, AMC 1987 
British Aerospace Rover Group 1988 
Ford Jaguar 1989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 XIV 
 
 
Strategic alliances 1990-1999 
 
Company Company Year Description 
BMW Rolls-Royce 1990 Parts and engines supplying 
PSA Peugeot-
Citroen) Dongfeng Motors 1990 Chinese JV / Car production 
Renault Volvo 1990 
Cross shareholdings / Joint R&D and Production / 
Platform Sharing 
PSA Peugeot-
Citroen) Dacia 1991 Platform and engines supplying 
Ford Nissan 1991 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Mitsubishi Volvo 1991 Joint production facility 
Skoda VW 1991 Joint R&D and Production / Platform Sharing 
VW FAW (China) 1991 Chinese JV / Car production 
VW Ford 1991 Joint production facility 
PSA Peugeot-
Citroen) Renault (Powertrain...) 1992 Joint development engines and parts 
Hyundai Mitsubishi 1992 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Nissan Ford 1993 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Nissan Isuzu 1993 Cross supply of parts and engines 
Isuzu Honda 1994 Cross supply of vehicles (badge engineering) 
Tata Daimler 1994 Indian JV / Car production 
Ford Mahindra 1995 Indian JV / Car production 
GM SAIC 1995 Chinese JV / Car production 
Suzuki Chongqing Changan 1995 Chinese JV / Car production 
BMW Rover Chrysler BMW 1997 Joint production facility 
Daimler  Ford 1997 Joint development engines and parts 
Ford 
Jiangling Motors 
Corporation 1997 Chinese JV / Car production 
Kia Dongfeng Motors 1997 Chinese JV / Car production 
Bentley BMW 1998 Parts and engines supplying 
Daewoo AvtoVAZ 1998 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Hyundai 
Dewan Farooque Motors 
Limited 1998 Pakistan JV / Car production 
Suzuki GM (now strategic alliance) 1998 Joint development engines and parts 
PSA Peugeot-
Citroen) Ford 1999 Joint development engines and parts 
PSA Peugeot-
Citroen) Mitsubishi 1999 Joint development engines and parts 
Fiat 
Nanjing Automobile 
Corporation (NAC) 1999 Chinese JV / Car production 
Honda GM 1999 Cross supply of parts and engines 
Nissan Renault 1999 
Cross shareholdings / Joint R&D and Production / 
Platform Sharing 
Subaru Mitsubishi 1999 
Cross shareholdings / Joint R&D and Production / 
Platform Sharing 
Subaru GM 1999 Joint R&D and Production / Platform Sharing 
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Mergers and Acquisitions 1990-1999 
 
Company Acquired Company Year 
Fiat Maserati 1993 
Ford Aston Martin 1994 
BMW 
Rover, Land Rover, MG, 
Mini 1994 
VW Skoda 1994 
Ford Mazda 1996 
Maserati Ferrari 1997 
VW Bentley 1998 
VW Bugatti 1998 
Daimler  Chrysler 1998 
Toyota - Daihatsu 1998 
Hyundai Motor 
Company Kia 1998 
VW Lamborghini 1998 
VW Rolls Royce 1998 
Renault Dacia  1999 
GM Isuzu 1999 
Ford Volvo 1999 
 
 
 
Strategic alliances 2000-2011 
 
Company Company Year Description 
Fiat GM 2000 
Cross shareholdings / Joint R&D, Purchasing 
and Production / Platform Sharing 
Suzuki GM 2000 Joint R&D and Production / Platform Sharing 
Ford Changan 2001 Chinese JV / Car production 
Hyundai DaimlerChrysler 2001 Parts and engines supplying 
Suzuki Nissan 2001 Parts, engines and vehicles supplying 
GM AvtoVAZ 2002 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Hyundai BAIC 2002 Chinese JV / Car production 
Hyundai Hawtai Motor 2002 Chinese JV / Car production 
Mitsubishi DaimlerChrysler Hyundai 2002 Joint R&D and Production / Platform Sharing 
Rover  Tata Motors 2002 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Suzuki 
General Motors Corp., Fuji Heavy 
Industries Ltd. and Isuzu Motors Ltd 2002 Joint purchasing 
Toyota PSA 2002 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
BMW 
Brilliance China Automotive Holdings 
Ltd 2003 Chinese JV / Car production 
Daihatsu Huali/FAW/Tianjin 2003 Chinese JV / Car production 
Honda Dongfeng Motor 2003 Chinese JV / Car production 
Mitsubishi Nissan 2003 Cross supply of vehicles (badge engineering) 
Nissan Dongfeng 2003 
Chinese JV / Car production / Badge 
engineering 
Suzuki Fiat 2003 Joint production one car / Badge engineering 
BMW PSA Peugeot Citroen 2004 Electro-Hybrid development 
Rover  SAIC 2004 Joint R&D and Production / Platform Sharing 
 XVI 
 
 
BMW GM and DaimlerChrysler 2005 Electro-Hybrid development 
PSA  Mitsubishi 2005 Parts and engines supplying 
Ford Fiat 2005 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Ford Daimler 2005 Joint development engines and parts 
Toyota Subaru 2005 Joint R&D and Production / Platform Sharing 
VW Audi; Porsche 2005 Parts and engines supplying / Platform Sharing 
Daimler  DaimlerChrysler Chery 2006 Export cooperation 
GAZ Daimler Chrysler  2006 
Parts and engines supplying and license 
agreement 
GM Isuzu 2006 
Joint development engines and parts / Platform 
sharing 
Mazda Chongqing Changan 2006 Chinese JV / Car production 
Tata Fiat 2006 Indian JV / Car production 
Toyota Isuzu 2006 
Joint R&D and Production / Platform Sharing /  
Electro-Hybrid development 
Toyota Guangzhou (GAC) 2006 Chinese JV / Car production 
VW Chrysler 2006 Joint production one car / Badge engineering 
Daimler  
Fujian Motors Group and China Motor 
Company (Mitsubishi) 2007 Chinese JV / Car production 
Fiat TATA 2007 Technologies sharing 
Honda Guangzhou (GAC) 2007 Chinese JV / Car production 
Renault Mahindra 2007 Indian JV / Car production 
Daihatsu Fuji Heavy Industry (Subaru!) 2008 Parts, engines and vehicles supplying 
Mitsubishi Proton 2008 Parts and engines supplying / Platform Sharing 
Renault AvtoVAZ 2008 Russian Joint Venture / Car production 
Daimler  Tesla 2009 Electro-Hybrid development 
Fiat Guangzhou (GAC) 2009 Chinese JV / Car production 
GM FAW 2009 Chinese JV / Car production 
Suzuki VW 2009 
Cross shareholdings / Technologies sharing / 
Market entry 
Toyota Aston Martin 2009 Parts supplying / Platform Sharing 
BMW Fisker 2010 Electro-Hybrid development 
BMW Saab 2010 Parts and engines supplying 
PSA Ford 2010 Joint development engines and parts 
PSA  BMW 2010 Electro-Hybrid development 
PSA  Changan 2010 Chinese JV / Car production 
Daimler  Renault-Nissan 2010 Joint development engines and parts 
Daimler  BYD 2010 Electro-Hybrid development 
Daimler  BMW 2010 Joint purchasing 
Daimler  Toyota  2010 Electro-Hybrid development 
GAZ Daimler 2010 Russian Joint Venture / Car production 
Mitsubishi Nissan 2010 Electro-Hybrid development 
Mitsubishi Guangzhou (GAC) 2010 Chinese JV / Car production 
VW Maruti Suzuki 2010 Joint production cars (badge engineering) 
Toyota Tesla 2010 Electro-Hybrid development 
Audi 
BMW, Daimler, Ford, General Motors, 
Porsche and Volkswagen 2011 Electro-Hybrid development 
BMW Toyota 2011 Electro-Hybrid development 
Daimler  BAIC 2011 Chinese JV / Car production 
Ford Sollers (Russia) 2011 Russian Joint Venture / Car production 
Mazda Sollers (Russia) 2011 Russian Joint Venture / Car production 
Subaru Chery Automobiles 2011 Chinese JV / Car production 
Suzuki Fiat 2011 Parts and engines supplying 
Toyota Ford 2011 Electro-Hybrid development 
Toyota Mitsubishi 2011 Joint development parts 
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Toyota Sollers (Russia) 2011 Parts and engines supplying 
VW GAZ 2011 Russian Joint Venture / Car production 
VW SAIC FAW 2011 Chinese JV / Car production 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions 2000-2011 
 
Company 
Acquired 
Company Year 
Ford Land Rover 2000 
GM Daewoo 2001 
Daimler  Mitsubishi 2001 
Daewoo SAIC-GM 2002 
BMW Rolls-Royce 2003 
Tata Daewoo 2004 
Nanjing Automobile Group (later 
SAIC) MG 2005 
Ceberus Capital Management Chrysler 2007 
Investment Dar & John Siders Aston Martin 2007 
Tata Jaguar  2008 
Tata Land Rover 2008 
Fiat Chrysler 2009 
VW Porsche 2009 
Geely Volvo 2010 
Mahindra SsangYong 2011 
   
 
 
Calculations of the level of significance 
The motives for the conclusion of strategic alliances 
 
  Growth strategies/Entering new markets 
  Correlation T-Value 
Absolute 
value P-Value 
Obtaining new 
technologies 0,1905 2,1527 2,152722558 3,32929869% 
Cost minimization -0,5076 -6,5342 6,53416529 0,00000015% 
Reduce financial risk -0,4098 -4,9821 4,982137986 0,00020798% 
Sharing tangible 
resources -0,4938 -6,2972 6,297214114 0,00000049% 
Market-entry barriers 0,6185 8,7301 8,73012987 0,00000001% 
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 Obtaining new technologies 
 Correlation 
T-
Value 
Absolute 
value P-Value 
Growth 
strategies/Entering new 
markets 
0,1905 2,1527 2,152722558 3,32929869% 
Cost minimization -0,2549 -2,9239 2,923869606 0,41165794% 
Reduce financial risk -0,3394 -4,0017 4,00172854 0,01078872% 
Sharing tangible 
resources -0,1759 -1,9815 1,981527522 4,97624668% 
Market-entry barriers 0,2951 3,4251 3,425067287 0,08359085% 
 
  Cost minimization 
  Correlation T-Value 
Absolute 
value P-Value 
Growth 
strategies/Entering new 
markets 
-0,5076 -6,5342 6,53416529 0,00000015% 
Obtaining new 
technologies -0,2549 -2,9239 2,923869606 0,41165794% 
Reduce financial risk 0,5718 7,7301 7,730102012 0,00000001% 
Sharing tangible 
resources 0,8800 20,5434 20,54335693 0,00000001% 
Market-entry barriers -0,8289 -16,431 16,43129877 0,00000001% 
 
  Reduce financial risk 
  Correlation T-Value 
Absolute 
value P-Value 
Growth 
strategies/Entering new 
markets 
-0,4098 -4,9821 4,982137986 0,00020798% 
Cost minimization -0,3394 -4,0017 4,00172854 0,01078872% 
Obtaining new 
technologies 0,5718 7,7301 7,730102012 0,00000001% 
Sharing tangible 
resources 0,5188 6,7311 6,731134405 0,00000006% 
Market-entry barriers -0,4980 -6,3682 6,368222901 0,00000035% 
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 Sharing tangible resources 
 Correlation T-Value 
Absolute 
value P-Value 
Growth 
strategies/Entering 
new markets 
-0,4937 -6,2972 6,297214114 0,00000049% 
Obtaining new 
technologies -0,1758 -1,9815 1,981527522 4,97624668% 
Cost minimization 0,8799 20,5433 20,54335693 0,00000001% 
Reduce financial 
risk 0,5188 6,7311 6,731134405 0,00000006% 
Market-entry 
barriers -0,7976 -14,6689 14,66893207 0,00000001% 
 
  Market entry barriers 
  Correlation T-Value 
Absolute 
value P-Value 
Growth 
strategies/Entering 
new markets 
0,6185 8,7301 8,73012987 0,00000001% 
Obtaining new 
technologies 0,2951 3,4251 3,425067287 0,08359085% 
Cost minimization -0,8289 -16,431 16,43129877 0,00000001% 
Reduce financial risk -0,4980 -6,3682 6,368222901 0,00000035% 
Sharing tangible 
resources -0,7977 -14,668 14,66893207 0,00000001% 
 
The relation between alliance formations and the number of independent car 
manufacturers 
 
Correlation T-Value Absolute value P-Value 
-0,718372637 -2,065302538 2,065302538 11% 
 
Correlation between the production volumes and the rate of alliance formations 
 
Correlation T-Value Absolute value P-Value 
0,674250787 1,825994704 1,8259947 10% 
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Abstract (English) 
In times of globalization and increasing competition, companies need to rethink their 
corporate strategies. From market transactions to hierarchical integration, companies 
hold a wide range of possible expansion forms in order to increase the company’s 
profitability and value. In this thesis, hybrid arrangements of market transactions and 
vertical integration, namely strategic alliances, are analysed.  
Academics and consultants see in strategic alliances a source of competitive 
advantage and multiple benefits. However, high levels of failure, demonstrated by 
different studies have proven, that the development and implementation of strategic 
alliances is a challenging task. Nevertheless, alliances have become a crucial part of 
many global companies’ expansion strategies. Inter-firm collaborations turned out to 
be beneficial in many ways, especially in industries with R&D costs, like for instance 
the automotive industry. 
The automotive industry evolved considerably in the past three decades. On one hand, 
new markets emerged and great technological progresses were achieved. On the other 
side, new competitors mainly from China and India entered the existing markets, the 
mobility requirements changed, the product ranges became wider and fuel prices are 
increasing constantly. However, many companies lack in financial resources and 
technological capacities to bear all these challenges alone. 
In this context, this thesis serves to analyse the development of strategic alliances 
between original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the past thirty years form a 
practical and theoretical point of view. Furthermore, it is analysed if the theoretical 
perspectives serve as explanatory approaches for the conclusion of strategic alliances.  
In addition, the empirical data, which contains a listing of all the concluded alliances 
from 1980 to 2011, is analysed to find further indicators for the rate of alliance 
conclusions such as the motives, the number of competitors, the economic cycle.  
The paper is divided in six chapters. The focus lies on the theoretical explanations, a 
description of the cyclical evolution of the automotive industry, an explicit illustration 
of the connections between the car manufacturers, the bonding between theory and 
practice, as well as on the elaboration of the different hypotheses. 
Keywords: Automotive industry, Strategic Alliances, Mergers and Acquisitions, 
Transactions Costs Theory, Resource Based View, Strategic Choice Perspective, 
Diversification Theory 
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Abstract (German) 
In Zeiten von Globalisierung und zunehmendem Wettbewerb müssen Unternehmen 
ihre Unternehmensstrategie neu überdenken. Von Markttransaktionen bis zu 
hierarchischer Integration, stehen Firmen eine breite Palette an möglichen 
Expansionsformen zur Verfügung, um die Rentabilität des Unternehmens zu erhöhen. 
In dieser Magisterarbeit werden strategische Allianzen, und somit eine Hybridform 
von Markttransaktionen und vertikaler Integration, analysiert. Laut führenden 
Wissenschaftlern und Wirtschaftsberatern können strategischen Allianzen zu 
verschiedenen Wettbewerbsvorteilen führen. Allerdings ist das Risiko eines 
Scheiterns auch sehr hoch. 
Somit ist die Entwicklung und Umsetzung von strategischen Allianzen ein 
anspruchsvolles und aufwendiges Vorhaben. Dennoch wenden viele international 
agierende Unternehmen strategische Allianzen an, um ihre Expansionsvorhaben um 
zu setzen. Vor allem in Industrien mit hohen Forschungs- und Entwicklungskosten, 
wie beispielsweise der Automobilindustrie, finden strategische Allianzen eine häufige 
Anwendung. 
Die Automobilindustrie hat sich in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten erheblich weiter 
entwickelt. Einerseits entstanden neue Märkte in den Schwellenländer. Andererseits, 
jedoch drängten neue Wettbewerber, vor allem aus China und Indien, auf den 
Automobilmarkt, die Kundenanforderungen haben sich verändert und die 
Produktpaletten werden immer breiter, zudem steigen die Treibstoffpreise 
unaufhörlich. Allerdings fehlen vielen Unternehmen in finanziellen Ressourcen und 
technologischen Kapazitäten, um all diese Herausforderungen allein zu tragen. 
In diesem Zusammenhang, dient die vorliegende Arbeit dazu die Entwicklung von 
strategischen Allianzen zwischen Automobilherstellern aus theoretischer sowie 
praktischer Sicht zu analysieren. Es wird geprüft, ob theoretische Konzepte wie 
beispielsweise die Transaktionskostentheorie als Erklärungsansätze für die Gründung 
von strategischen Allianzen dienen können. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert, ob  
Faktoren wie die spezifischen Motive, die Anzahl der Wettbewerber und der 
konjunkturelle Entwicklung bei der Gründung von Allianzen ausschlaggebend sind. 
Die Arbeit ist in sechs Kapitel unterteilt. Der Fokus liegt auf einer theoretischen 
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Ausarbeitung strategischer Allianzen, einer Beschreibung der konjunkturellen 
Entwicklung der Automobilindustrie, einer chronologischen Darstellung der 
Verbindungen zwischen den Automobilherstellern, sowie auf einer Beurteilung der 
Zusammenhänge zwischen Theorie und Praxis. 
 
Schlagwörter: Automobilindustrie, strategische Allianzen, Fusionen und 
Übernahmen, Transaktionskosten Theorie, Resource Based View, Strategic Choice 
Perspective, Diversifikationstheorie  
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